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HHS STAKEHOLDER RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF 
STATUTORY ENTRENCHMENT AND AGENCY 
OVERREACH 
Colin Roskey* & Tamara Tenney*  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Concerns about agency overreach are everywhere—on Capitol 
Hill, in courts, among regulated industries, in the presidential candidate 
debates.  The U.S. House of Representatives is suing the Obama 
Administration on the theory that it acted outside its authority in 
establishing cost-sharing subsidies under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA).1  Members of the Catholic Church are likewise suing to protect 
their faith-based practices in the face of Executive Branch overreaches 
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1 U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, Case 1:14-cv-01967 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 2014); 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
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that would diminish or squander these practices.2  Elsewhere, regulated 
industries and affected stakeholders are expressing discomfort with new 
Department of Labor regulations governing the application of overtime 
pay requirements for companions of certain disabled individuals, despite 
a congressional statute expressly exempting them.3  Critics of agency 
excess identify a wide range of undesirable consequences of aggressive 
agency behavior, ranging from threats to individual rights to affront to 
the separation of powers undergirding our nation’s constitutional 
structure. 
  In the health care arena, the consequences of agency overreach are 
magnified by the Obama Administration’s recognized goal of “federal 
statutory entrenchment” for the Administration’s signature 
accomplishment, the ACA.4  If the Administration’s policies become 
deeply embedded in the health care programs administered by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its divisions, 
including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a 
subsequent administration will face tremendous barriers when seeking to 
unravel those policies—a critical problem given that some of those 
policies conflict with governing law and fall outside agency authority.  
This is a concern that should not divide along party lines, since both 
Republicans and Democrats have an interest in ensuring that Executive 
Branch agencies do not transgress the duly enacted laws of Congress. 
  This Article explores three specific areas in which CMS has acted 
in excess of statutory authority, in support of statutes passed almost 
exclusively by congressional Democrats,5 as examples of the broader 
trend within HHS (and other Executive Branch agencies).  Further, the 
Article seeks to place these instances of CMS overreach in the context of 
 
2 Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, No. 15-105 (and 
consolidated cases) (S. Ct. cert granted Nov. 6, 2015); Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-
1418 (and consolidated cases) (S. Ct. cert granted Nov. 6, 2015).  
3 Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. 
60454 (Oct. 1, 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2015) (upheld by Homecare Ass’n of America 
v. Weil (D.C. Cir. 2015)). 
4 See Abbe R. Gluck, Why Health Lawyers Must Be Public-Law Lawyers: Health 
Law in the Age of the Modern Regulatory State (hereinafter Gluck, Health Lawyers), 
18 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 323, 338 (2015) (identifying the 
Administration’s “federal statutory entrenchment” objective).   
5 More specifically, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 
2008 (MIPPA), discussed infra, was enacted over President Bush’s veto (383-41 in 
the House, 70-26 in the Senate), while the ACA passed the Senate (60-39) and the 
House (219-212) without a single Republican vote. 
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widespread discomfort with agency self-aggrandizement—both 
examining important dangers of such behavior, if left unchecked, and 
discussing ways Congress and the courts can help reign in excessive and 
unlawful agency action.  In particular, the Article recommends that 
Congress enact a novel, narrow legislative provision modeled on the qui 
tam provisions of the False Claims Act6 that would enable government 
employee whistleblowers to challenge agency overreach.  Finally, an 
overarching theme of this Article is that health care lawyers have the 
opportunity, and in fact the obligation, to identify instances of agency 
overreach that may be confined to specific industry segments and thus 
easily overlooked but that have significant, detrimental effects in the 
aggregate as part of a larger pattern of agency self-aggrandizement. 
 
II.  EXECUTIVE OVERREACH IN THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION AS EXEMPLIFIED BY 
ULTRA VIRES ACTIONS OF CMS 
  Executive agencies have occupied the spotlight often in recent 
months, with Members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, academics, 
and others calling attention to executive agency overreach.  Such 
concerns as a general matter are nothing new.7  Recently, however, the 
agency behavior underlying these concerns has grown increasingly 
aggressive, in particular within HHS and the division of HHS responsible 
for administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, CMS, in the 
wake of the Obama Administration’s 5-4 victory at the Supreme Court in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).8  The 
 
6 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
7 See Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal 
Agency Emergency Powers (hereinafter Boliek, Agencies in Crisis), 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3339, 3358 (2012-2013) (“The concern attributed to potential or perceived 
overreach of federal agencies’ delegated authority is almost cyclical over time.  
Distress over agency overreach has waxed and waned and has generally mirrored the 
countervailing concerns for agency efficiency and expediency.”). 
8 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  In this highly controversial decision, the Supreme Court 
upheld the ACA against challenges to the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate.  While an adverse decision for the Administration could have dismantled 
the ACA, the favorable decision enabled the Administration to continue pushing 
forward aggressively with its implementation efforts, bolstered by the support it 
seemed to have garnered—for a variety of disparate reasons—from the Court’s slim 
majority.  See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 83, 84, 85 (2012) (characterizing Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion in 
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Administration’s forceful attempts to weave its policy goals into the 
fabric of governing law make its agencies’ violations of the law along the 
way of critical significance.  Faced with federal agencies bent on 
entrenching their policies, often unimpeded by statutory boundaries on 
their authority, health care community stakeholders must be on the 
lookout for unlawful agency actions and prepared to challenge them in 
order to help protect providers and federal health care program 
beneficiaries against agency aggression.  The following section situates 
these considerations in the context of existing congressional and judicial 
desire to reign in agency overreach and highlights the importance of this 
issue in the health care arena given the Administration’s concentrated 
efforts toward entrenchment of the ACA and other Democratic health 
policy priorities. 
A.  Current Judicial and Congressional Attention to Agency 
Overreach 
  Worries about potential agency self-aggrandizement have existed 
perhaps as long as executive agencies themselves.9  Congress enacted the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946 in large part to establish 
some limits on agency action, implementing requirements designed to 
foster transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, including notice-and-
comment rulemaking and judicial review.10  Still, for years, Congress has 
delegated authority to agencies to hammer out the details of statutes 
enacted by Congress, often in very broad terms.  The Supreme Court has 
allowed this to occur, provided that the legislation offers an “intelligible 
 
NFIB as “a consummate act of institutional diplomacy” that “avoided the 
unpalatable result of having the Court invalidate President Obama’s signature 
achievement in the midst of a close reelection campaign by a 5-4 vote that would 
have mapped the Justices’ ideological leanings,” and as a “jurisprudential 
compromise” with many “disparate features [tied] together [by] a commitment to 
preserving the Court as an institution . . . allowing the Court to rise above the 
political fray surrounding the challenges to the ACA’s constitutionality while still 
reinforcing the Court’s supremacy in constitutional interpretation”). 
9 See Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1242-44 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (chronicling the “ancient roots” of the “idea 
that the Executive may not formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct,” 
which is in tension with the delegation of legislative authority to executive 
agencies). 
10 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2012). 
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principle” to guide the agency’s implementation efforts,11 a test that in 
practice has served as a very low bar to clear.12  Despite the resultant lack 
of agency adherence to statutory requirements, Congress long sat happily 
with this arrangement that enabled it to insulate itself from political 
backlash by passing broad legislation and letting agencies make the 
difficult and controversial implementation decisions—the hide-behind-
the-agency defense (“Don’t blame us!  We just voted for clean air . . . it’s 
the Environmental Protection Agency costing you thousands of dollars in 
compliance”). 
  However, “congressional comfort with the liberal delegation of its 
own legislative role has waned more in recent years,”13 as evidenced by 
the introduction of numerous regulatory reform bills in the Senate and 
House in the 114th Congress14 and multiple recent congressional 
committee hearings on agency overreach.15  Notably, in testimony for a 
June 2015 hearing on agency excess, Senate Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Chuck Grassley called upon the Judiciary Committee to 
“improve our oversight of [the APA]” in light of “the threat of agency 
overreach.”16  The introduced bills are also designed to halt agency 
 
11 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (establishing the 
intelligible principle test).  
12 See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1246 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“Although the Court may never have intended the boundless standard the 
‘intelligible principle’ test has become, it is evident that it does not adequately 
reinforce the Constitution’s allocation of legislative power.”). 
13 Boleik, Agencies in Crisis, supra note 7, at 3358. 
14 See George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, Regulatory Reform 
Legislation, 114th Congress, 
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulatory-reform-legislation-114th-
congress (last visited Jan. 9, 2016) (providing a partial list of introduced regulatory 
reform legislation).  
15 See, e.g., Examining the Proper Role of Judicial Review in the Federal Regulatory 
Process: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs’ Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management 
(hereinafter Proper Role of Judicial Review), 114th Cong. (2015); Examining the 
Federal Regulatory System to Improve Accountability, Transparency and Integrity: 
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (hereinafter Examining the Federal 
Regulatory System), 114th Cong. (2015); A Review of Regulatory Reform Proposals: 
Hearing Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee, 114th Cong. (2015). 
16 Examining the Federal Regulatory System, supra note 15, (statement of Senator 
Chuck Grassley, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman) (hereinafter Grassley 
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overreach in various ways, such as by requiring congressional approval 
prior to implementation of regulations that would have a significant 
economic effect.17 
Several Justices on the Supreme Court have also taken issue with 
agency self-aggrandizement, including notably the Chief Justice, who 
cautioned recently:  “When it applies, Chevron is a powerful weapon in 
an agency’s regulatory arsenal. . . It would be a bit much to describe the 
result [of overly generous judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
vague statutory language] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the 
danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be 
dismissed.”18  In several recent cases, the Court has seemed willing to use 
tools of statutory construction to help address this concern about agency 
overreach.19  The Court’s most recent and hotly contested ACA decision, 
 
statement)) (June 10, 2015), at 1, available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06-10-15-grassley-statement. 
17 Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2015, S. 226, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  
18 City of Arlington. v. FCC., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (dissenting opinion joined in full by Kennedy, J., and Alito, J.).  See also 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
multiple cases that “bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially 
unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron 
deference,” and contending that “[w]hat EPA claims for itself here is not the power 
to make political judgments in implementing Congress’ policies, nor even the power 
to make tradeoffs between competing policy goals set by Congress,” but rather “the 
power to decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals 
EPA wishes to pursue”) (internal citations omitted); see also Perez v. Mortg. 
Bankers, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211-112 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)(“By 
deferring to interpretive rules, we have allowed agencies to make binding rules 
unhampered by notice-and-comment procedures.  The problem is . . . perhaps 
insoluble if Chevron is not to be uprooted”). 
19 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (examining the provision’s text, 
context, and “backdrop of [the agency’s] established administrative practice” in a 
one-step Chevron analysis and finding the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA’s) statutory interpretation to be “unreasonable”); see Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. 
Ct. 1980 (2015) (refusing to apply either Chevron or Skidmore deference when 
overturning a Board of Immigration Appeals statutory interpretation as 
“incongruous” and making “scant sense”); see Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 
2427, 2439, 2441 (2014) (overturning an EPA regulation in a one-step Chevron 
analysis that relied on the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the 
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the 
overall statutory scheme”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).  
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King v. Burwell, might present courts with an enhanced toolbox, perhaps 
through the broader application of major questions doctrine at Chevron 
Step Zero,20 whereby courts may find that an increasing number of 
statutes raise questions of such political or economic significance—or 
complexity—that courts, rather than agencies, should resolve any 
ambiguities,21 or through a more aggressive contextualist approach to 
statutory interpretation under which courts would use their overarching 
understanding of “Congress’ plan” to resolve statutory ambiguities at 
Chevron Step One and then have no reason to defer to agencies’ 
interpretations at Chevron Step Two.22  Nevertheless, the long-lasting 
import of King remains to be seen,23 and the Supreme Court will have 
 
20 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (coining the 
term “Chevron Step Zero” to describe this preliminary consideration). Under the 
doctrine laid out in Chevron v. NRDC, in evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that it administers, courts first determine whether the statute is clear and 
unambiguous (Chevron Step One); courts and agencies are bound to follow clear 
statutes, but courts will defer to an agency’s construction of an ambiguous statute 
that is “reasonable” or “permissible” (Chevron Step Two).  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron applies only if 
Congress intended to delegate authority to resolve statutory ambiguities to the 
agency—a determination often called Chevron Step Zero.  One reason a court may 
decide at Chevron Step Zero that Congress did not delegate an interpretive question 
to an agency is if the case presents a “major question” of “economic and political 
significance.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000); King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). 
21 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (characterizing the statutory question in the case as 
“a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this 
statutory scheme” and finding that “had Congress wished to assign that question to 
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly”)(quoting Brown & Williamson, 
529 U.S. at 133).  See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: 
Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Rulemaking (hereinafter 
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes), 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 93 (2015)(“King . . . may have 
announced a more limited deference doctrine for complex statutes”).  
22 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496 (noting that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair 
understanding of the legislative plan” and adopting the reading “consistent with 
what we see as Congress’s plan”).  See Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, supra note 21, at 
96 (“Perhaps Chevron lives on, but only for mundane or confined questions that do 
not implicate the functionality of the overall statutory structure”). 
23 As of January 4, 2016 at least 20 federal appellate cases in nine circuits have 
interpreted King, primarily citing it for the limited, well-established principle that 
“the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in 
the overall statutory scheme.”  King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  A few circuit courts have 
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opportunities to clarify King’s jurisprudential impact on the scope of 
Chevron, as early as this Term, if the Court so desires.24 
  Importantly, as leading administrative and tax law scholar 
Professor Kristin Hickman cautioned: 
  Forecasting the future impact of any Supreme Court case is an iffy 
proposition.  Often, a case that seemed potentially consequential when 
the Court decided it turns out to be a one-off, as the Court distinguishes 
and minimizes it into near nothingness.  Such treatment seems especially 
likely when the case concerns a high-profile and politically-controversial 
issue, as in King v. Burwell.25 
  Present, it is impossible to know whether King will end up 
representing a significant doctrinal statement about Chevron’s scope, 
““fade into obscurity as doctrinally insignificant with respect to 
Chevron’s scope,” or whether it will have an impact somewhere in 
between these two extremes.26  Regardless, the fact remains that many of 
the Supreme Court’s other recent decisions have showcased the Court’s 
desire and willingness to narrow agency deference in some 
circumstances.  Deference does seem to be on the decline.27 
 
gone further, suggesting that King allows courts to depart from plain statutory text.  
See, e.g., G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 2015); 
In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2015).   
24 Briefs in the consolidated contraceptive mandate cases currently on the Supreme 
Court docket and in the net neutrality case pending in the D.C. Circuit, which is 
expected ultimately to reach the Supreme Court, are raising this question.  See, e.g., 
Brief for the Cato Institute and Independent Women’s Forum, Amici Curiae at 29-
32, Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015) (and consolidated cases) (cert granted, 
Nov. 6, 2015); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 11-12, U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 4, 2015). 
25 Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell 
(hereinafter Hickman, Unintended Consequences), 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 70, 71 
(citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) “representing another example of a high-
profile, politically-controversial case that the Court has largely ignored since”). 
26 Id. at 66, 71. 
27 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, King v. Burwell: What Does It 
Portend for Chevron’s Domain, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 72, 73, 81 (2015) (concluding 
that “although King was an ‘extraordinary case’ for the Court, Chevron’s heyday 
may be on the wane” and cautioning that “our one-time expectations regarding 
judicial deference to agency interpretations may require reevaluation”).  
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B.  Agency Overreach Intensified by the Obama Administration’s 
Federal Statutory Entrenchment Goal 
  Much has been written about the Obama Administration’s 
aggressive pursuit of the President’s political priorities.  Republican 
presidential candidate Senator Ted Cruz, recently penned a powerful 
critique of the Obama Administration’s executive overreach through its 
unconstitutional refusal to enforce laws.28  Significantly, two prominent, 
liberal law professors, Jonathan Turley and Laurence Tribe, have levied 
major criticisms of the President’s tactics.  Professor Tribe submitting 
joint comments on the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan and calling the 
Administration’s rule a “remarkable example of executive overreach and 
an administrative agency’s assertion of power beyond its statutory 
authority.”29  Professor Turley, serving as lead counsel in the lawsuit 
brought by the U.S. House of Representatives, challenging the legality of 
various aspects of the Administration’s implementation of the ACA.30  
Discomfort with the Obama Administration’s executive overreach is not 
confined to the Republican Party. 
  In the health care arena, agency overreach has sprung up in the 
context of a carefully designed Administration strategy to get the ACA 
(and its other policy preferences, both current and historic) “entrenched.”  
As expressed by Yale Law School (YLS) Professor Abbe Gluck, Faculty 
Director of the Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy at YLS 
(Solomon Center), and leading national expert in, among other things, 
health law, legislation, statutory interpretation, and the intersection of 
these fields: 
  The whole philosophy of the ACA on the federal side is just to get 
this thing in the door and improve it down the line.  It is a very pragmatic 
politics.  The President’s interest—unlike that of many state officials—is 
long term.  He wants to get the statute entrenched.  HHS, therefore, is 
 
28 Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J. 
OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 99-100 (2015), available at, http://www.harvard-
jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Cruz_Final.pdf.). 
29 Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 1, 2014), at 3, 
available at http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/Tribe-
Peabody_111(d)_Comments_(filed).pdf. 
30 Stephen Gutowski, Jonathan Turley Named Lead Counsel for House Suit Against 
Obama, The Washington Free Beacon (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://freebeacon.com/politics/jonathan-turley-named-lead-council-for-house-suit-
against-obama/.  
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likely willing to do whatever it can within the limits of the law to let even 
resistant states adopt the ACA in some way, whether it is by restricting 
Medicaid, or doing something creative with the exchanges.  . . .  [E]ach 
additional state action to implement the ACA, it is critical to remember, 
enmeshes the statute further in a state’s legal, bureaucratic, and political 
web.  In other words, it is not that the federal government is desperate; 
rather, it is acting with a long term strategy of federal statutory 
entrenchment—a common story in the statutory-law literature that health 
lawyers need to understand.  This is how to ensure that even if a 
Republican gets elected President, the statute is more likely to be 
tweaked than repealed.31 
  The Administration’s goal of “entrenching” the ACA and other 
Democrat-”owned” statutes has animated the agencies responsible for 
their implementation—all the more since the Administration’s 5-4 
victory in NFIB. 
  Illustrating this motivation and pursuit of statutory entrenchment 
are the remarks delivered by former HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius at 
the November 2015 launch of the Solomon Center.  In describing her 
work with the lawyers at HHS to implement the ACA, former Secretary 
Sebelius stated: 
  Knowing what the framework of the law was, we had a lot of 
issues where the statute was not totally crystal clear.  I needed a creative 
legal team working with me to say, “Here is the goal.  I don’t want to 
break the law.  That’s part of your job, but the default position can’t be, 
‘You can’t do this because we can’t figure it out,’ because we could 
never make any progress that way.  So I will work with you but we have 
to figure out how to get from here to here.  And if this door closes, what 
other doors can open and how can we move along the way?” 32 
 
31 Gluck, supra note 4, at 338-39 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
Federal statutory entrenchment has been discussed in the context of many other 
statutes aside from the ACA.  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John 
Ferejohn, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) 
(articulating a theory of “superstatutes” that become “entrenched” in our nation’s 
legal framework).  See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, 50 DUKE. L.J. 1215, 1216, 1231-32, 1237 (2000) (contending that 
“superstatutes” become entrenched “after lengthy normative debate” and “prove 
robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time” and characterizing numerous 
laws as superstatutes, including the Sherman Act of 1890, the National Labor 
Relations Act of 1935, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Kathryn E. Kovacs, 
Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1209 
(2015) (characterizing the APA as an entrenched superstatute). 
32 Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, The New Health Care Industry: 
Integration, Consolidation, Competition in the Wake of the Affordable Care Act at 
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  This description reflects the “win at any cost” nature of the 
Administration’s implementation efforts in relation to the ACA and other 
Democrat legacy statutes—an attitude that has persisted under Secretaries 
since Sebelius’s tenure.33 
C.  Health Care Lawyers’ Responsibility to Call Attention to Small 
Agency Oversteps that in the Aggregate Are Changing the 
Landscape 
  Former Secretary Sebelius is correct that problem-solving often 
requires having a “creative legal team,” something recognized and valued 
by clients of successful lawyers in many practice areas.  In addition, the 
Administration’s goal of statutory entrenchment for the ACA, or any of 
its past or future priorities, could be accomplished legally as a general 
matter.34  However, this Article contends that in the course of seeking to 
use all “creative legal” means to implement and entrench the ACA, the 
Administration has in fact overstepped its boundaries and that this 
aggrandizement of HHS authority with respect to the ACA has carried 
over to HHS’s other core objectives. 
  Specifically, this Article takes a close look at three statutory 
authorities that CMS has transgressed in recent years—testing a new 
payment model under the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
(CMMI) authority established by the ACA implementing a new 
certification requirement for Medicare reimbursement of home health 
services added by the ACA, and one in the course of administering 
payment for Medicare’s End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) benefit under 
a provision added by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and 
Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA),35 another statutory initiative for which 
the Administration claims ownership rights.  While the policies has CMS 
has pursued in each instance may appear relatively insignificant other 
 
45:59-46:40, https://www.law.yale.edu/solomon-center/events/inaugural-
conference,,(address by Kathleen Sebelius – former Secretary, Health and Human 
Services, at the Nov. 12, 2015 launch of the Solomon Center, discussing the 
evolving landscape of health care law, policy, and governance and the connections 
with the practice of medicine) (last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
33 Throughout this Article, “Secretary” refers to the Secretary of HHS. 
34 We bracket for now any issues regarding the constitutionality of various aspects 
of the ACA, noting that unconstitutional laws cannot be legally implemented 
through statutory entrenchment efforts or otherwise.  
35 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008). 
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than from the perspective of the health care provider communities 
regulated by them, these narrow matters have import for the broader 
health care community because they represent a more widespread 
phenomenon at HHS.36  To ignore CMS’s unauthorized expansion of its 
authority in narrow situations allows a dangerous degree of agency self-
aggrandizement to take root. 
  A critical way health care lawyers, in particular, can encourage 
HHS and its divisions to stay within the scope of their statutory authority 
is to bring detailed knowledge of a wide variety of discrete issues from 
daily practice, along with an intimate understanding of the functioning of 
HHS into ongoing national health reform conversations.  A problem that 
is not clearly identified, or whose magnitude is not well understood, 
cannot be solved; health lawyers must use their expertise to bring to light 
statutory violations—in court, in public comments submitted to agencies, 
and in other forums—in order to help prevent further entrenchment of 
unlawful policies.  Given that “[w]e . . . have a Supreme Court that . . . 
does not have much health law experience, does not really understand the 
statutory schemes, and certainly does not take a coherent approach to the 
issues in the field,”37 active monitoring by health care lawyers and 
stakeholders is an essential component of curtailing the excessive HHS 
actions that have begun to characterize its health policy implementation 
efforts.  Regardless of the merits of the Administration’s underlying 
policy choices (which are debatable), the Executive Branch must comport 
with statutes enacted by the Legislative Branch; ends do not justify the 
means in a society governed by the rule of law.  Health lawyers must do 
their part in getting HHS back on track. 
 
36 Arguably, this trend toward aggrandizement of agency authority is occurring in 
federal agencies across the board.  See, e.g., Damien M. Schiff & Luke A. Wake, 
Leveling the Playing Field in David v. Goliath: Remedies to Agency Overreach 
(hereinafter Schiff & Wake, Agency Overreach), 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 97 (2012-
2013) (addressing aggressive overreaches by the EPA); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 14-840) (argued Oct. 14, 2015) (evaluating whether 
FERC’s “demand response” rule exceeds the agency’s statutory authority); OSHA’s 
Regulatory Agenda: Changing Long-Standing Policies Outside the Public 
Rulemaking Process: Hearing before the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce’s Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014) 
(statement of Maury Baskin on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers 
and Associated Builders and Contractors) at 1, available at 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/baskin_testimony.pdf (regarding an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) policy that contradicts 
governing statutory authorities). 
37 Gluck, Health Lawyers, supra note 4, at 345.  See also Abbe R. Gluck, 
Symposium Issue Introduction: The Law of Medicare and Medicaid at Fifty 
(hereinafter Gluck, Symposium), 15 YALE J. POL’Y & ETHICS 1, 19 (2015) (“health 
lawyers have an important role to play in educating the courts about the health 
statutes themselves, and the relationships among them”). 
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III.  SIGNIFICANT EXAMPLES OF CMS 
OVERREACH IN THE WAKE OF NFIB 
  This section identifies three Medicare program policies that CMS 
has implemented in recent years without the statutory authority to do so.  
These policies are in a sense unremarkable, as they are but three of many 
similar examples of CMS overreach, but they are featured here because 
they reveal current, active legal positioning from the agency and include 
the same level of resistance to stakeholder concern on both merits and 
process.  In each instance, CMS rejected, without meaningful 
explanation, stakeholders’ challenges regarding the nature and extent of 
the agency’s authority to proceed toward its regulatory objectives, in one 
instance even through a year of consequential litigation against the 
government in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.  CMS 
overreach of this sort has permeated the agency’s ACA implementation 
efforts, as well as its momentous implementation work involving both 
prior and forthcoming Medicare law. As the Administration has sought to 
entrench the ACA, its agency lawyers appear to be freely applying that 
principle to non-ACA-related policy implementation, increasingly so 
after the Administration’s NFIB win.  The consequences of overreach, 
therefore, are broader and deeper than just the fabric of the ACA itself 
and its stakeholders.  The evolution of Medicare law, like other federal 
statutory schemes, is highly dependent on career professionals at 
executive agencies, in this case CMS, to implement congressional 
imperatives.  The current entrenchment logic threatens all providers and 
suppliers with actions that could present significant new costs or 
consequences with diminished access to judicial review. 
 
A.  CMS’s Unprecedented and Unauthorized Mandatory 
Implementation of the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement 
Model 
  CMS recently issued a final rule adopting a new bundled payment 
model for hip and knee replacement surgery and recovery, called the 
Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model (CJR 
Model), which requires certain hospitals to participate in the model (the 
“CJR Final Rule”).38  In the CJR Final Rule, CMS cited the CMMI 
 
38 Comprehensive Care of Joint Replacement Payment Model for Acute Care, 80 
Fed. Reg. 73274, 72326 (Nov. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 510). 
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authority created by Social Security Act (SSA) Section 1115A,39 as well 
as the Secretary’s “authority under both sections 1102 and 1871 of the 
[SSA] to implement regulations as necessary to administer Medicare,” as 
affirmatively authorizing CMS to make the CJR Model mandatory for all 
hospitals and downstream post-acute care (PAC) providers in designated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).40  Contrary to CMS’s claims, 
none of these statutes authorize the agency to mandate participation in 
new payment models.  Moreover, CMS’s cursory references to these SSA 
provisions in the CJR Final Rule—in response to questions raised by 
commenters about the agency’s lack of authority—reveal a troubling lack 
of attention by the agency to its statutory boundaries. 
  With respect to SSA Section 1115A, CMS posited that “[t]he 
statute does not require that models be voluntary, but rather gives the 
Secretary broad discretion to design and test models that meet certain 
requirements as to spending and quality” and noted that “[a]lthough 
section 1115A(b) of the [SSA] describes a number of payment and 
service delivery models that the Secretary may choose to test, the 
Secretary is not limited to those models.”41  Those brief mentions of the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute allowed for the agency to provide a 
more thorough description of their policy-based reasons for preferring a 
mandatory participation model, which CMS described as “necessary” and 
“the most prudent approach.”42  Chief among these policy reasons was 
CMS’s contention that there is “selection bias inherent to any model in 
which providers may choose whether to participate” and that the agency 
would acquire broader and hence more useful data if it required 
participation from hospitals that otherwise would opt not to participate.43 
  Despite the reasonableness of CMS’s belief that a mandatory 
model could produce more representative data that could, in turn, better 
inform the agency’s policy choices going forward, it is a well-established 
principle of statutory construction that an agency may not depart from 
clear statutory text in service of policy choices (without regard to the 
merits of those policies).44  Departing from unambiguous statutory 
 
39 SSA Section 1115A (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012)). 
40 80 Fed. Reg. at 73278; SSA § 1102 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)); SSA § 
1871 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2012)). 
41 80 Fed. Reg. at 73277-73278. 
42 Id. at 73278. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(finding that an agency may not “avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed in 
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language is precisely what CMS did here, given that CMS adopted a 
statutory interpretation that offered “broad discretion” to the Secretary—
discretion that the agency relied upon to implement its preferred policy—
without looking more carefully at the limitations on that “broad 
discretion” that are equally present in the statute.  The brief discussion in 
the CJR Final Rule suggests that CMS read the absence of an explicit 
statement that models must be voluntary, along with the existence of a 
variety of models that CMS is permitted but “not limited” to pursue, as 
conferring very wide-ranging authority on the agency.  While CMS is 
correct that the statute permits the Secretary broad discretion in the 
selection and design of models for testing, this discretion is not 
unlimited.  The statute’s text, structure, and purpose together clearly 
demonstrate that one limitation upon this authority is that models may 
not be mandatory, regardless of the lack of an explicit statement to this 
end.45 
  Section 1115A of the SSA is structured as a set of interlocking 
provisions that together establish the CMMI and govern the activities the 
CMMI is permitted and required to perform.  The main provisions 
bearing on the question of whether CMS can make models mandatory 
are: subsection (a), which identifies the CMMI’s purpose and provides 
overarching guidelines (including a geographic limitation, which is key 
to this analysis); subsection (b), which governs the testing of models 
(Phase I); and subsection (c), which covers the expansion of models 
(Phase II).46  Subsection (a) identifies the purpose of the CMMI as “to 
 
the text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy”) 
(quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); S. 
California Edison Co. v. FERC, 195 F.3d 17, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that an 
agency may not contravene clear and unambiguous statutory language in order “to 
improve, in its view, upon Congress’ design”).   
45 CMS would be well-advised to consider the D.C. Circuit’s cautioning in Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA regarding this very type of agency attempt to divine authority based 
solely on the absence in the statute of an explicit denial of that power to the agency.  
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“To suggest, as the 
[agency] effectively does, that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute 
does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative power . . . is 
both flatly unfaithful to the principles of administrative law, and refuted by 
precedent.  . . . [W]ere courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express 
withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a 
result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely the Constitution as 
well. . . . We refuse, once again, to presume a delegation of power merely because 
Congress has not expressly withheld such power.”) (emphasis in original). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)-(c) (2012).   
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test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program 
expenditures under the applicable subchapters while preserving or 
enhancing the quality of care furnished to individuals under such 
subchapters.”47  The terms “test” and “testing” are used throughout SSA 
Section 1115A to describe the Secretary’s activities under this 
provision.48  Subsection (b) provides the Secretary with broad discretion 
to “select models to be tested where the Secretary determines that there is 
evidence . . . [of] poor clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable 
expenditures”—Phase I testing.49  Subsection (c) permits the Secretary to 
“expand (including implementation on a nationwide basis) the duration 
and the scope of a model that is being tested under subsection (b)” if the 
model being tested meets certain requirements outlined in the provision 
(including some based on an evaluation of economic and quality data 
collected)—Phase II expansion.50 
  It is in light of this structure of Phase I testing and Phase II 
expansion, that the geographic limitation in SSA Section 1115A(a)(5) 
provides critical insight into whether models may be mandatory.  The 
geographic limitation reads: “For purposes of testing payment and 
service delivery models under this section, the Secretary may elect to 
limit testing of a model to certain geographic areas.”51  Following CMS’s 
reading of the statute as allowing the agency to mandate participation in 
the Phase I testing of a model, Section 1115A(a)(5) would allow CMS 
either to “elect to limit” this testing to certain MSAs and mandate 
participation by providers in those MSAs (as CMS has done with the CJR 
Model), or to elect not to limit the test to specific MSAs—i.e., conduct 
the test in all MSAs—and therefore mandate participation by providers in 
all MSAs.  This reading is CMS’s view that it has authority to make 
models mandatory. 
  However, this reading is untenable in light of the broader context 
of the statute. The statute first establishes Phase I testing and, second, 
Phase II expansion “including implementation on a nationwide basis” 
after certain requirements have been met.52  CMS’s interpretation allows 
 
47 § 1315a(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).   
48 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(5) (2012) (“Testing within certain geographic 
areas”); § 1315a(b) (2012) (“Testing of models (Phase I)”); § 1315a(d)(1) (2012) 
(“Waiver authority . . . with respect to testing models described in subsection (b)”). 
49 § 1315a(b)(2) (2012). 
50 § 1315a(c) (2012). 
51 § 1315a(a)(5) (2012) (emphasis added). 
52 Id.; § 1315a(a)(5), (c) (2012).   
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the agency, through, the geographic limitation provision, to mandate a 
model to be tested at Phase I for all providers nationwide, which is de 
facto “implementation on a nationwide basis,” and the statute only allows 
for Phase II expansion.53  The structure of the statute, establishing Phase I 
testing and Phase II expansion, prohibits this reading because it would 
result in the collapse of the distinction between Phase I testing and Phase 
II expansion.  Thus, when the Secretary’s broad discretion to “test” 
models is read in the context of the statute as a whole, it is clearly limited 
by the requirement that models not be made mandatory. 
  In addition, this view of the limitation on the Secretary’s discretion 
coheres with the statute’s purpose as articulated in the provision itself, 
i.e., “to test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce 
program expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of 
care.”54  One of the main purposes of SSA Section 1115A models is to 
enable CMS to collect data, on payment or delivery policies, that could 
lower Medicare or Medicaid program costs and improve quality of care 
for beneficiaries.  Congress has granted the Secretary the authority to test 
models in recognition of the inadequacy of available data in many 
instances for evaluating policy reforms under consideration.  Voluntary 
testing of these models allows CMS to gather quality and economic data 
that can inform future policy decisions.  Mandating participation in 
models, prior to testing in a voluntary subset, would ignore this chief 
reason why the CMMI model authority exists in the first place—i.e., to 
allow collection of information that is absent but needed to evaluate the 
appropriateness of widespread implementation of a new policy.  In the 
case of the CJR Model, the lack of comparable data across various PAC 
settings was so widely recognized that Congress passed the Improving 
Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 to 
enable collection of this information.55  In contrast to CMS’s claim that 
“it is necessary” to mandate participation to acquire adequate data to 
evaluate the CJR Model’s bundled payment approach,56 the enactment of 
the IMPACT Act shows that it is in fact possible for CMS to stay within 
 
53 Id. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1).  As reaffirmed in King, a statement of purpose included 
in the statutory text can be a useful guide to interpreting the provision.  King, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2493 (“We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated 
purposes.”) (quoting New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 
405, 419-420 (1973)). 
55 Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-185, 128 Stat. 1952. 
56 80 Fed. Reg. at 73278. 
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its statutory boundaries (i.e., to keep all CMMI models voluntary) and for 
a broader data set to be developed (in this case, through an act of 
Congress). 
  Just as the text, structure, and purpose of SSA Section 1115A do 
not authorize CMS to make CMMI models mandatory, neither do the 
other two provisions CMS cited in the CJR Final Rule for authority, SSA 
Sections 1102 and 1871.57  Section 1102 of the SSA provides, in relevant 
part, that the Secretary “shall make and publish such rules and 
regulations, not inconsistent with [the SSA], as may be necessary to the 
efficient administration of the functions with which [the Secretary] is 
charged under [the SSA],” and SSA Section 1871 states, “[t]he Secretary 
shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
administration of the insurance programs under this title.”58  In the case 
of both of these provisions, CMS seems to have picked out the “as may 
be necessary” language as authorizing CMS to mandate participation in 
the CJR Model—based on the agency’s view that the information to be 
furnished by mandatory participants in the model is “necessary”59—
without regard to the limiting language in these provisions.  This limiting 
language is critical to an appropriate interpretation of these statutory 
provisions and determination of whether they do, in fact, authorize CMS 
to mandate participation in CMMI models. 
  For SSA Section 1102, this limiting language requires the 
Secretary to issue regulations “not inconsistent with [the SSA]”—a 
limitation that would preclude CMS from adopting the CJR Final Rule 
based on its inconsistency with SSA Section 1115A’s proper reading as 
authorizing only voluntary models.60  CMS must comply with all SSA 
provisions, even if a liberal reading of one provision would seemingly 
permit a certain course of action.  For SSA Section 1871, the limiting 
language stipulates that the regulations must be “necessary to carry out 
the administration of the [Medicare program].”61  Whereas CMS has 
persuasively established the usefulness of the data it seeks to obtain under 
the mandatory CJR Model, CMS’s strong policy preferences do not make 
mandatory implementation of the model “necessary to carry out the 
administration” of the Medicare program.62  Hence, these broad grants of 
 
57 Id. 
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1395hh (2012) (emphasis added). 
59 80 Fed. Reg. at 73278. 
60 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2012). 
62 Id. (emphasis added). 
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administrative authority under SSA Sections 1102 and 1871 may not 
properly be read as allowing CMS to violate other more detailed statutes 
simply by alleging that the action in question is “necessary.”63  
Accordingly, in the absence of any applicable statutory authorities 
allowing the action, CMS has acted ultra vires in mandating provider 
participation in the CJR Model. 
B.  CMS’s Unauthorized Addition of a Physician Narrative 
Requirement to the Home Health Agency Certification Provision 
  Since 1965, the Medicare program has paid for home health 
services under Part A and, after 1997, under both Parts A and B, only 
when a physician has certified in writing that a patient was homebound, 
under a plan of care established by a physician, and in need of skilled 
nursing services on an intermittent basis, or physical and speech 
therapy.64  These requirements are part of the physician certification 
provision of the SSA established as an anti-fraud measure and designed 
to curb fraud by attaching civil and criminal penalties to false or 
fraudulent certifications.65  In Section 6407 of the ACA, Congress added 
a new requirement to the physician certification provision, requiring the 
physician provider to “document” that the physician (or other specified 
qualified health professional) had a “face-to-face encounter” with the 
patient “within a reasonable timeframe as determined by the Secretary.”66 
CMS implemented this statutory provision by issuing a regulation that 
required the physician to: 
  document that the face-to-face patient encounter, which is related 
to the primary reason the patient requires home health services, has 
occurred no more than 90 days prior to the home health start of care date 
 
63 Long-standing rules of statutory construction stipulate that more specific statutes 
trump more general ones when potential interpretive conflicts arise.  See, e.g., D. 
Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) (“General language of a 
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply to 
a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.  Specific 
terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might 
be controlling.”) (internal citations omitted); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 
490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989) (“A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless 
there is no more specific rule.”).  
64 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 1307, 1320a-7a (2012). 
66 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6407 (codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012)). 
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or within 30 days of the start of the home health care by including the 
date of the encounter, and including an explanation of why the clinical 
findings of such encounter support that the patient is homebound and in 
need of either intermittent skilled nursing services or therapy services as 
defined in § 409.42(a) and (c) respectively.67 
  This explanation was referred to as the “physician narrative” 
requirement. 
  CMS’s addition of the physician narrative requirement in this 
regulation represents a stark violation of the unambiguous language of 
the statute, based on its text, context, and congressional intent clearly 
expressed therein. Therefore, though CMS rescinded the physician 
narrative requirement effective January 1, 2015, this example of 
overreach is well worth discussing for two critical reasons.  First, CMS’s 
bold imposition of tremendously burdensome, impracticable, and 
confusing requirements on providers for nearly four years—over and 
against these providers’ frequent communications with the agency 
regarding the unworkability of the requirement and their repeated 
requests for adequate guidance—reveals an agency bent on entrenching 
the ACA without appropriate attention to the clear language of the 
statute.  Second, the harm caused to home health agencies (HHAs) during 
the time the requirement was in effect was significant and will go 
unaddressed, even if CMS never reinstates the unauthorized physician 
narrative requirement.  The former issue—the significant overreach 
represented by CMS’s physician narrative requirement—is addressed 
below in this section.  The latter issue—HHAs’ uncompensated costs of 
compliance with an unlawful regulation—is a continuing problem with 
agency overreach across the board, and is addressed below in Section 
IV.A.2. of this Article. 
  In a legal challenge to CMS’s authority to implement the 
physician narrative requirement, HHS (on behalf of CMS) contended that 
the statutory requirement for the physician to “document” the face-to-
face encounter was sufficiently ambiguous to allow CMS to reasonably 
interpret it as authorizing CMS to require the physician to “document” by 
composing a narrative.68  The D.C. District Court sided with HHS in this 
challenge, concluding that “HHS’s reading of the statute—although not 
the most natural one—is not foreclosed by its authorizing provision and 
 
67 42 C.F.R. § 424.22(a)(1)(v) (eff. Apr. 1, 2011 – Dec. 31, 2014) (emphasis added).  
68 Memorandum accompanying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, at 2, Nat’l Ass’n for 
Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, 77 F. Supp. 3d 103 (2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00950-
CRC (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2014). 
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that it is otherwise reasonable.”69  Both HHS and the D.C. District Court, 
however, failed to read the face-to-face encounter provision properly 
within the broader context of SSA Section 1814(a).  Reading this 
provision “in [its] context and with a view to [its] place in the overall 
statutory scheme”70 demonstrates that the “most natural” reading of the 
statute’s requirement to “document”—i.e., that “document” means sign, 
date, or check a box—is the only reasonable one here. 
  ACA Section 6407 amended the physician certification 
requirement, which falls within the Medicare limitation on payment 
provision, at SSA Section 1814(a),71 and the requirements in SSA 
Section 1814(a) that pre-dated the face-to-face encounter certification 
requirement require the physician to check a box, write a date, sign his or 
her name—basic tasks designed to certify critical information, but not 
intended to duplicate, replace, or even supplement clinical information 
already in the medical record.72 This makes sense, given that SSA 
Section 1814(a) was enacted as an anti-fraud measure, with significant 
civil and criminal penalties attaching for fraudulent certifications; the 
purpose of the provision is to reduce fraud by requiring physician 
certification, with there being both (1) adequate incentives for the 
 
69 Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, Case No. 14-cv-00950 (CRC) 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148456, *3 (D.D.C. 2015). 
70 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 1395f (2012). 
72 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(4) (2012) (requiring certification that inpatient 
psychiatric hospital services furnished cohere with the hospital’s records of such 
services); 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(5) (2012) (requiring certification that, for inpatient 
hospital services provided beyond the 20th consecutive day, there were not any long-
stay payment limitations in place for the hospital at the time of the patient’s 
admission); 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A) (2012) (requiring certification that an 
individual receiving hospice services is terminally ill “based on the physician’s or 
medical director’s clinical judgment”).  In addition, for home health services, while 
it was never clear precisely what information CMS expected to be included in the 
physician narratives, all relevant clinical information justifying the beneficiary’s 
homebound status would already be present on a variety of standardized HHA 
admission forms mandated by CMS.  These certification requirements existed in 
various forms prior to the ACA before they were aggregated and, by regulation, 
conflated into the physician narrative requirement under ACA Section 6407.  In the 
case of hospice, extensive Conditions of Participation (CoPs) controlled the ordering 
of services, the designation of a patient’s terminal illness, and the medications each 
received, before the ACA substituted its own judgment, and that of the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission, by inserting a face-to-face encounter requirement 
(similar to that required for HHAs) in ACA Section 3132(b)(2).   
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physician to certify accurately and (2) sufficient medical information 
elsewhere in the clinical record to meet other Medicare program 
requirements.  CMS cannot create authority for itself to add new medical 
record requirements based on an anti-fraud provision addressing only 
basic signature and box-checking as certification.  Had Congress wanted 
to change the medical record statutes to enable or require CMS to 
establish a physician narrative requirement, it could have specified so 
directly.  Instead, Congress amended the physician certification 
provision, which is aimed at an entirely different goal from the medical 
record provision (combatting fraud versus ensuring that health care 
services are medically necessary).  Interpreting “document” any way 
other than signing, dating, or checking a box does not cohere with the 
structure or context of SSA Section 1814(a). 
  Moreover, the text of SSA Section 1814(a), as amended by ACA 
Section 6407, limits the Secretary’s discretion to determining when the 
physician must complete the face-to-face encounter with the patient with 
respect to the date home health services commence.  Specifically, the 
statute provides: “the physician must document that the physician himself 
or herself [or another specified qualified health professional] . . . has had 
a face-to-face encounter . . . with the individual within a reasonable 
timeframe as determined by the Secretary.”73  Congress left the Secretary 
discretion to determine the length of a “reasonable timeframe” but did 
not authorize the Secretary either explicitly or implicitly to add a 
physician narrative requirement to this clear and unambiguous provision.  
Saying that “document” is ambiguous shows either CMS’s failure to read 
the rest of SSA Section 1814(a), which contains multiple examples of 
“check-the-box” style requirements,74 or, worse, a willful attempt to 
create ambiguity where none exists in order to claim authority for 
implementing the agency’s favored policy. 
  Unfortunately, both of these possible rationales can result in 
agency overreach and entrenchment of unlawful policies, and can result 
from the high degree of deference afforded by courts to agency statutory 
interpretations.  As noted in testimony before Congress in a hearing 
regarding problems with judicial deference to agency action, the Chevron 
doctrine “has fundamentally changed the way that agencies go about their 
business of interpreting governing statutes.  The search for meaning in 
Congress’s commands has been replaced with a hunt for ambiguities that 
 
73 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(C) (2012) (emphasis added). 
74 See, supra, note 72. 
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might allow the agency to escape its statutory confines.”75  In the case of 
the physician narrative requirement, despite the D.C. District Court 
getting it wrong, HHAs have some relief at the moment due to CMS’s 
voluntary rescission of the unauthorized requirement.76  Still, this 
overreach reveals CMS’s propensity to aggressively implement policy 
with inadequate attention to the law in efforts to entrench the ACA (and 
other Democratic priority statutes), and it potentially represents an 
emboldened agency actively searching for ambiguities to exploit as 
alleged justifications for its policies of choice. 
C.  Expansion of the ESRD PPS Bundle in Violation of the Statutory 
Definition of “Renal Dialysis Services” 
  The Medicare program began covering individuals with kidney 
failure regardless of age under the ESRD benefit in 1973.77  Initially, 
Medicare paid for dialysis services on a fee-for-service basis.  In August 
of 1983, pursuant to a congressional mandate,78 Medicare began paying 
for dialysis services using the “composite rate” system, a blended 
prospective payment and fee-for-service system.  Under the composite 
rate system, dialysis facilities received a single, prospectively determined 
payment amount per treatment that was intended to cover certain 
regularly provided drugs, laboratory tests, and supplies.  Dialysis 
facilities billed Medicare separately for other drugs that were not 
included in the composite rate (“separately billable drugs”).  Initially, the 
composite rate payment included most of the items and services routinely 
used in dialysis, and reimbursement for separately billable drugs was 
intended to help ensure that providers’ costs of furnishing other non-
composite rate items were properly recognized, preserving opportunities 
for high-quality care for beneficiaries.79  Over time, as new drugs were 
 
75 Proper Role of Judicial Review, supra note 15, (statement of Andrew Grossman, 
Associate, BakerHostetler and Adjunct Scholar, The Cato Institute) (hereinafter 
Grossman statement) (Apr. 28, 2015), at 7, available at, 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=00FD3227-284A-453D-9A0F-
F7B9B660F7B0.  
76 However, reimbursements withheld from HHAs due to purported noncompliance 
with the rescinded narrative requirement remain unreturned.   
77 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991 (1972). 
78 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2145 (1981). 
79 Notwithstanding the design features of this two-part system, dialysis facilities in 
many instances faced challenges meeting their costs since the system did not include 
an annual updating mechanism or “market basket increase” factor, unlike every 
other Medicare payment system at the time.   
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developed and practice standards evolved, medical guidelines and 
physician prescribing patterns supported greater use of erythropoietin 
stimulating agents (ESAs) and other supportive care drugs like 
intravenous (IV) iron that helped improve life quality for patients on 
dialysis. 
  By the mid-2000s, regulators and Congress had begun focusing on 
the still-growing utilization of and cost associated with separately billable 
drugs, for which the system had no significant clinical or operational 
policy constraint (other than CMS’s own sub-regulatory prescribing 
guidelines for ESAs, and labeling changes from the federal Food and 
Drug Administration, neither of which made a material impact on overall 
utilization).80  Congress addressed these matters in MIPPA, enacted in 
2008, which required CMS to adopt a bundled prospective payment 
methodology for ESRD services that would include composite rate 
services as well as separately billable drugs, with the expectation that the 
broader bundle including ESAs would lead to more efficient care 
delivery and lower overall resource use.81  The new system would also 
include, for the first time since the benefit was created, an annual 
automatic updating mechanism.  Congress was so confident in that 
utilization reduction result that it built a mandatory two percent savings 
into the new system. 
  The statutory provision establishing the ESRD prospective 
payment system (PPS) directs the Secretary to “implement a payment 
system under which a single payment is made under this title to a 
provider of services or a renal dialysis facility for renal dialysis services 
(as defined in subparagraph (B)) in lieu of any other payment.”82  
Subparagraph (B) defines “renal dialysis services” as follows: 
  (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “renal dialysis 
services” includes— 
  (i) items and services included in the composite rate for renal 
dialysis services as of December 31, 2010; 
 
80 The composite rate system generally allowed for items and services to come into 
and out of the payment system, like electrocardiogram and nerve conduction testing, 
though the system’s flaws prevented it from being financially viable in the long run.  
See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 97-208, 948-49 (July 29, 1981) (describing system).   
81 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), § 
153(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B) (2012)). 
82 Social Security Act, § 1881(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1395rr(b)(14)(A) (2012)). 
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  (ii) erythropoiesis stimulating agents and any oral form of such 
agents that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of end stage 
renal disease; 
  (iii) other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to individuals 
for the treatment of end stage renal disease and for which payment was 
(before the application of this paragraph) made separately under this title, 
and any oral equivalent form of such drug or biological; and 
  (iv) diagnostic laboratory tests and other items and services not 
described in clause (i) that are furnished to individuals for the treatment 
of end stage renal disease. 
  Such term does not include vaccines.83 
  Congress has not modified the statutory definition of “renal 
dialysis services” since its adoption in 2008.  Importantly, as discussed in 
detail below, a key deficiency in this definition is the absence of an 
authorized way for CMS to incorporate new technologies. 
  It is this four-pronged statutory provision that CMS has now 
violated twice in overt and dramatic ways with its own interpretations 
that directly contradict the clearly expressed congressional intent 
regarding what CMS may include in the ESRD PPS bundle—first, by 
adding “oral-only drugs” into the bundle in 2011,84 and more recently, by 
adding new IV or injectable drugs into the bundle, effective January 1, 
2016.  In addition, over time CMS has gradually and quietly inserted 
additional items into the bundle, a phenomenon known as “bundle 
creep.”  All of these expansions exceed the agency’s statutory authority 
and showcase CMS’s willingness to ignore or twist beyond the point of 
recognition legislative language that would otherwise get in the way of 
the agency’s desired policies. 
  CMS commenced this unauthorized expansion of the bundle when 
first adopting the regulations implementing the ESRD PPS—specifically, 
the regulation defining “renal dialysis services” paid for under the ESRD 
PPS.85  The regulation text closely parallels the statutory text at each of 
 
83 Social Security Act, § 1881(b)(14)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B) 
(2012)). 
84 For a variety of reasons and on multiple occasions, Congress has delayed the 
implementation of CMS’s inclusion of oral-only drugs in the bundle until 2025.  
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, § 632(b), 126 Stat. 
2313 (2012); Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–93, § 
217(a)(1), 128 Stat. 1040 (2014); Achieving a Better Life Experience Act of 2014, 
Pub. L. No. 113-295, § 204 (2014).  
85 CMS has not altered this definition since adopting it in the calendar year 2011 
ESRD PPS Final Rule.  See End-Stage Renal Disease, 75 Fed. Reg. 49030 (Aug. 12, 
2010) (adopting 42 C.F.R. § 413.171, defining “renal dialysis services” and other 
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the four prongs with one critical exception in the third prong regarding 
“other drugs and biologicals.”  The third prong of the regulatory 
definition reads: “Other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to 
individuals for the treatment of ESRD and for which payment was (prior 
to January 1, 2011) made separately under Title XVIII of the Act 
(including drugs and biologicals with only an oral form).”86  The 
statutory text, in contrast, provides for “any oral equivalent of such drug 
or biological.”87  CMS’s change in terminology here, while subtle, results 
in a statutory construction that defies logic and an agency policy that 
flagrantly departs from the congressional limitations contained in the 
statute. 
  One point of similarity between the statutory and regulatory text is 
that both clearly identify this prong as including drugs for which payment 
was made prior to the January 1, 2011 implementation date of the ESRD 
PPS (i.e., drugs that existed and were reimbursed by Medicare as 
separately billable drugs before the ESRD PPS became effective).  The 
statute then allows “any oral equivalent” of a previously separately 
billable drug to be paid under this prong, but nowhere allows oral-only 
drugs to be reimbursed because, by definition, an oral-only drug cannot 
be the “equivalent” of any non-oral drug.  Drugs paid as separately 
billable before 2011 could have “oral equivalent” versions of them 
developed later and reimbursed under this prong, but because an oral-
 
terms, and adding or amending numerous other ESRD-related regulations).  The 
regulatory definition reads:  
Renal dialysis services. Effective January 1, 2011, the following items and services 
are considered “renal dialysis services,” and paid under the ESRD prospective 
payment system under section 1881(b)(14) of the Act: 
(1) Items and services included in the composite rate for renal dialysis services as of 
December 31, 2010; 
(2) Erythropoiesis stimulating agents and any oral form of such agents that are 
furnished to individuals for the treatment of ESRD; 
(3) Other drugs and biologicals that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of 
ESRD and for which payment was (prior to January 1, 2011) made separately under 
Title XVIII of the Act (including drugs and biologicals with only an oral form), 
(4) Diagnostic laboratory tests and other items and services not described in 
paragraph (1) of this definition that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of 
ESRD. 
(5) Renal dialysis services do not include those services that are not essential for the 
delivery of maintenance dialysis.  42 C.F.R. § 413.171 (2015). 
86 42 C.F.R. § 413.171(3) (2015) (emphasis added). 
87 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iii) (emphasis added).  For purposes of this prong, 
“such drug or biological” refers to drugs “furnished to individuals for the treatment 
of end stage renal disease and for which payment was (before the application of this 
paragraph) made separately under this title,” i.e., separately billable drugs.  Id. 
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only drug would not be “equivalent” to any separately billable drug, it 
cannot be reimbursed under this prong. 
  Despite this clear textual limitation from the statute, CMS added 
oral-only drugs into the regulation text, stating at the time, “. . .we 
believe that when the definition is viewed as a whole, it suggests a 
comprehensive definition that wraps in all items and services related to 
outpatient renal dialysis that are furnished to individuals for the treatment 
of ESRD.”88  Further, CMS contended that even if oral-only drugs could 
not fit in the third prong of the statutory definition, they could fit in the 
fourth prong, which the agency described as a “catchall category.”89  This 
explanation, which fails to grapple with the precise text of the statute, 
demonstrates CMS’s eagerness to locate an expansive “catchall,” or 
broad Secretarial discretion, enabling its desired policy to proceed. 
  A careful look at the “catchall” in prong (iv) of the statutory 
definition, however, shows that this prong is not the open-ended 
invitation for CMS to add any and all items and services into the bundle 
that CMS suggests it is.  Specifically, the category includes “diagnostic 
laboratory tests and other items and services not described in clause (i) 
that are furnished to individuals for the treatment of end stage renal 
disease.”90  In its efforts toward unconstrained bundle expansion, CMS 
has completely read this limiting language out of the text, using the 
“catchall” to cover any items or services at all, provided they were 
related to dialysis treatment,91 and sometimes when such items bore no 
connection to dialysis treatment but were inserted into the PPS for 
CMS’s or the patient’s convenience.92  When the provision is read as 
 
88 75 Fed. Reg. at 49040. 
89 Id. 
90 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iv) (2012) (emphasis added). 
91 75 Fed. Reg. at 49040.  More recently, CMS has articulated this same overly 
broad reading of the provision, stating, “We also read section 1881(b)(14)(B)(iv) as 
specifying a different category of items that must be included in the bundle—that is, 
items and services, which includes drugs and biologicals, not specified by sections 
1881(b)(14)(B)(i), (ii), or (iii).”  End-Stage Renal Disease, 80 Fed. Reg. 68968, 
69016 (Nov. 6, 2015) (emphasis added).  Significantly, the statutory text does not 
extend the catchall to items and services not described in clauses (i), (ii), or (iii), but 
rather only to “items and services not described in clause (i),” and CMS simply adds 
in “(ii) and (iii)” in direct contradiction of the statutory language. 
92 For example, rather than requiring patients to make a separate trip to a clinical 
laboratory for phlebotomy services, the ESRD PPS for a time included a number of 
tests unrelated to the treatment of ESRD, since it would be more convenient for 
patients to have all of their testing—both ESRD- and non-ESRD related—initiated 
at the same site of service, namely the ESRD facility.  CMS has since adjusted this 
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written, the limiting phrase restricts the “catchall” to items and services 
“not described in clause (i),” meaning items and services of the sort that 
might have been included in the original composite rate—i.e., not drugs.  
The statute, with its four specific categories, clearly and precisely handles 
reimbursement for drugs in prongs (ii) and (iii), whereas it addresses 
composite rate items in prong (i) and a limited set of other dialysis-
related items and services in prong (iv).  While there may be room for 
discussion and disagreement over the scope of prong (iv) with regard to 
which “other items and services” are in fact provided “for the treatment 
of [ESRD],” that prong simply cannot accommodate drugs given the 
structure of the statutory definition. CMS’s departure from the statutory 
text here foreshadowed future statutory violations by CMS in service of 
the same core objective—liberal expansion of the bundle in relentless 
pursuit of cost-savings with blind, or willful, disregard to statutory 
limitations on the agency’s discretion. 
  Since implementing the ESRD PPS, CMS has continued to 
gradually add items and services into the bundle.  For example, it has 
issued sub-regulatory guidance to contractors adding such items as 
venous catheter covers and other supplies, certain laboratory tests not 
related to the treatment of ESRD, and drugs.93  CMS has acknowledged 
this practice, for instance noting in the calendar year (CY) 2016 ESRD 
PPS Final Rule: 
  We’ve added new drugs to the ESRD PPS bundled payment 
consistent with this policy [of adding new drugs into the bundle when 
they fit into existing functional categories] in the years since the ESRD 
PPS was implemented and announced those additions using change 
requests.  These decisions have not been controversial because the drugs 
were substantially the same as other drugs in the functional category.94 
  This continual expansion of the bundle, known as “bundle creep,” 
has been controversial, despite what CMS insisted here.  The dialysis 
industry has repeatedly urged CMS to refrain from adding new items or 
 
position and has allowed facilities to designate such non-ESRD related tests with an 
“AY” modifier and to bill separately for them.   
93 See, e.g., CMS, Transmittal 2588 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/Downloads/R2588CP.pdf (adding peginesatide to 
the bundle); CMS, Transmittal 2949 (May 7, 2014), available at, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/Downloads/R2949CP.pdf (adding ferric 
carboxymaltose to the bundle).  
94 80 Fed. Reg. at 69017. 
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services to the bundle outside of rulemaking, without adequate funding, 
and most importantly, when those items and services do not constitute 
“renal dialysis services.”  CMS took a partial step toward acknowledging 
the latter concern in its December 2014 update to the Medicare Benefit 
Policy Manual, in which it noted throughout that only “renal dialysis 
services” that are “related to the treatment of ESRD” properly belong in 
the ESRD PPS.95  Still, the revisions in the Medicare Benefit Policy 
Manual may be a symbolic victory; to the extent that bundle creep has 
not been forestalled, it demonstrates the broader, dangerous trend of 
agencies slowly usurping more and more authority in small ways that 
eventually add up to a significant acquisition of unwarranted authority. 
  CMS’s most recent major departure from the statutory definition 
of “renal dialysis services” came with the agency’s decision to add new 
IV or injectable drugs into the bundle.  In the CY 2016 ESRD PPS Final 
Rule, CMS adopted a process for adding new injectable and IV products 
into the ESRD PPS bundle, contending that both Section 217(c) of the 
Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA)96 and the statutory 
definition of “renal dialysis services”97 give the agency authority to do 
so.98  However, neither of these statutes, in fact, confers upon the agency 
the authority it has claimed.  While PAMA Section 217(c) directed the 
Secretary to “establish a process” for “including new injectable and 
intravenous products into the bundled payment under such system,”99 it 
did not revise or supplant the existing “renal dialysis services” definition 
in the SSA, nor did it separately authorize CMS to implement that 
process without regard to the statutory definition.  Section 217(c) of 
PAMA and the “renal dialysis services” definition must be read in 
conjunction with one another under the well-established statutory 
construction principle disfavoring repeals by implication, which dictates 
that subsequent statutes do not replace preexisting laws unless Congress 
has clearly indicated so.100  Accordingly, while PAMA Section 217(c) 
 
95 See, e.g., CMS, Medicare Benefit Policy Manual (CMS Pub. 100-02), Ch. 11, at 
§§ 20, 20.2A, 20.3 (rev. Dec. 2014), available at, https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-Ioms-
Items/Cms012673.html. 
96 Pub. L. No. 113-93. 
97 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B) (2012). 
98 80 Fed. Reg. at 69016. 
99 Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, § 217(c). 
100 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (“[R]epeals by 
implication are not favored . . . and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is 
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requires CMS to design a process for adding new IV or injectable drugs 
to the bundle, the narrowly tailored categories of the “renal dialysis 
services” definition prohibit CMS from employing that process to add 
such drugs into the bundle without further congressional action.101 
  More specifically, none of the four prongs of the “renal dialysis 
services” statutory definition can accommodate new IV or injectable 
drugs.  The first prong explicitly includes only composite rate items and 
services paid for as of December 31, 2010, thus precluding the addition 
of any new items under this prong.  The second prong is limited to 
Epogen (EPO) and oral forms of ESAs and, as such, will not allow new 
non-ESA IV or injectable drugs.  Prong (iii) is date-stamped and tied to 
previously reimbursed items (i.e., separately billable drugs paid for prior 
to January 1, 2011) and also includes “any oral equivalent of such drug or 
biological” (i.e., separately billable drug)—so presumably it can 
accommodate new oral equivalent drugs here, but not new IV or 
injectable drugs.  This leaves prong (iv), which, far from being the 
expansive “catchall” that CMS has treated it as, is limited to certain 
“other items and services not described in clause (i),” indicating its 
unavailability for drugs, which are handled specifically and completely 
by prongs (ii) and (iii).102  Hence, in the absence of explicit congressional 
authorization to implement the drug designation process, CMS is 
brazenly pursuing policy without regard to the governing statute. 
 
 
clear and manifest.”) (internal citations omitted); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 293 
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “[w]e 
have not found any implied repeal of a statute since 1975.  And outside the antitrust 
context, we appear not to have found an implied repeal of a statute since 1917”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
101 Even on the view that PAMA Section 217(c)’s directive for CMS to “establish a 
process” is ambiguous with respect to whether “establish” means “design” (without 
implementing) versus “put into practice,” such ambiguity would not justify CMS 
beginning to implement that process; because the “renal dialysis services” definition 
so clearly lacks space to accommodate new IV or injectable drugs, any ambiguity 
regarding the meaning of “establish” must be resolved in favor of “design” (without 
implementing), lest the “renal dialysis services” definition be violated.  PAMA 
Section 217(c) did not authorize repeal by implication of the existing “renal dialysis 
services” statutory definition.  See Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 524 (requiring “clear and 
manifest” congressional “intent to repeal” in order to interpret a later statute as 
impliedly repealing a preexisting one). 
102 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr(b)(14)(B)(iv) (emphasis added).  
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IV.  BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS 
DISCUSSION 
  In each example discussed above, CMS adopted an interpretation 
of the relevant statutory provision that enlarged the agency’s authority 
and allowed it to pursue its chosen program goals.  Each agency 
overreach, in isolation, has caused significant difficulty for the health 
care providers directly subject to the ultra vires agency action.  
Moreover, health care providers who have escaped the direct effects of 
these specific overreaches should still take note because these relatively 
narrow instances are part of a more widespread trend within CMS (and 
HHS more generally) to expand its authority.  Every time the agency 
cites the Secretary’s “broad discretion” and proceeds to act in excess of 
actual statutory authority—and wins or is unchallenged—it becomes 
easier for the agency to do this again the next time.  This pattern of 
adopting unsupportable statutory interpretations that facilitate the 
agency’s chosen policies and increase its authority is, thus, potentially 
problematic to all parties under the regulatory authority of CMS. 
A.  Major Challenges Presented to Providers and Beneficiaries by 
Each Instance of CMS Overreach 
  Hospitals mandated to participate in the CJR Model, HHAs 
subjected to the impracticable physician narrative requirement, and 
dialysis facilities obligated under an ever-expanding bundle have all 
suffered from CMS’s unauthorized actions.  In each instance, Congress 
had written an unambiguous statutory provision that CMS is obligated to 
follow.  This section discusses the practical consequences to regulated 
parties and others affected by these abuses of authority. 
1. Challenges for Acute Care Hospitals, Downstream Providers, and 
Beneficiaries Under the CJR Model 
  It is important to understand that whereas CMS has mandated 
participation in the CJR Model by acute care hospitals in designated 
MSAs, the structure of the CJR Model effectively mandates participation 
in the model by PAC providers that serve beneficiaries treated in these 
hospitals.  That is, under the model, CMS pays the hospital a single 
bundled payment amount to cover the hip or knee joint replacement 
procedure performed in the hospital on a Medicare beneficiary as well as 
all PAC services received by the beneficiary relating to that procedure.  
Accordingly, since all the hospitals in a selected MSA (with very narrow 
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exceptions) would be mandatory participants, PAC providers who treat 
Medicare beneficiary patients from these hospitals would have the 
“choice” either to accept reimbursement under the CJR Model’s bundled 
payment or elect not to treat Medicare beneficiaries—not a meaningful 
choice in light of economic realities for PAC providers that tend to have 
Medicare-heavy patient mixes.  Therefore, any harmful effects of the 
CJR Model would be experienced not only by acute care hospitals in the 
selected MSAs, but also by downstream PAC providers and Medicare 
beneficiaries receiving hip or knee joint replacement treatment in those 
MSAs. 
  One of the key risks posed by mandatory implementation of the 
CJR Model stems from the inversion of the appropriate order for 
exploring new payment or delivery models—i.e., first, testing the model 
with a subset of providers (and beneficiaries) to allow data collection, 
and, second, evaluating whether to expand the model more broadly later, 
based on data collected, for all providers (and beneficiaries) in the 
payment system.  In the case of the CJR Model, Congress has already 
explicitly recognized the lack of comparable PAC data and enacted the 
IMPACT Act to address this.  CMS is, therefore, acting not only ultra 
vires but also unnecessarily, putting beneficiaries and providers at risk of 
a widely implemented, mandated model that could fail with substantial 
adverse consequences.  It is not a secret that some new models (or 
demonstration projects) fail—whether because the new policy does not 
save money, lowers quality of care, places unmanageable administrative 
burdens on providers, or for some other reason.103 
  In ordinary situations (of voluntary models), this does not pose a 
major problem, since providers can drop out of the model if needed and 
return to the applicable conventional Medicare program payment system 
Also, the “self-selection” risk CMS is troubled by (because it may skew 
data in voluntary models) actually provides a measure of protection in 
voluntary models because presumably providers know their own 
financial, clinical, and administrative capacities better than government 
regulators and choose to participate in models only when they believe 
they have a reasonable likelihood of viability under the model.  On the 
contrary, mandating all providers to participate—precisely to avoid self-
selection bias—removes this built-in protection for providers and the 
patients they serve.  By characterizing self-selection as a hurdle to be 
 
103 See, e.g., Deborah Peikes, et al., Effects of Care Coordination on Hospitalization, 
Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare Beneficiaries, 301 
J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 603 (2009).   
2016] HHS STAKEHOLDER RIGHTS 111 
 
overcome in pursuit of more “robust” data104 rather than the valuable 
provider and beneficiary protection mechanism that it is, CMS has put 
providers and beneficiaries at risk, unnecessarily and without 
justification. 
2.  Challenges for HHAs and Beneficiaries Under the Physician 
Narrative Requirement 
  For over three-and-a-half years, HHAs were subjected to 
significant administrative difficulties, confusion, and extensive costs of 
compliance by the unauthorized physician narrative requirement.  
Numerous Members of Congress were concerned about the “significant 
burden on home health providers and physicians in [their] districts,” 
including the increased “paperwork burden and cost to home health 
agencies which are struggling to comply with this regulation” and the 
potential “disincentive for physicians to recommend home health 
services.”105  Although CMS rescinded this requirement, effective 
January 1, 2015,106 HHAs cannot recoup the time and money they spent 
seeking to comply with that requirement for the nearly four years it was 
in effect.107 
  In the final rule rescinding this requirement, CMS mentioned that 
“[t]he home health industry continues to voice concerns regarding the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act face-to-face encounter 
documentation requirement” and explained its decision to remove the 
narrative requirement as “an effort to simplify the face-to-face encounter 
regulations, reduce burden for HHAs and physicians, and to mitigate 
instances where physicians and HHAs unintentionally fail to comply with 
 
104 80 Fed. Reg. at 73276. 
105 See Letter from Members of Congress to Marilyn Tavenner, CMS Administrator 
(Sept. 17, 2013), available at http://www.hca-
nys.org/documents/FinalF2FLetter091713.pdf.  The 75 signatures on this letter 
represent both Democrats and Republicans from across the country whose 
constituencies include urban, suburban, and rural populations.  
106 Calendar Year 2015 Home Health Prospective Payment System Update, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 66032 (Nov. 6, 2014).   
107  Realistically, HHAs would have begun to incur compliance costs prior to the 
April 2011 effective date of the physician narrative requirement, nearer to when 
CMS first proposed this requirement in July 2010, as providers must begin preparing 
for final rules before their effective dates.   
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certification requirements.”108  It is certainly encouraging when CMS 
seems to take seriously issues raised by providers and to develop or 
modify regulations and policies appropriately based on providers’ on-the-
ground knowledge and experience.  The notice-and-comment process 
established by the APA was designed to foster exactly that type of 
meaningful opportunity for regulated parties to communicate with 
agencies and affect agencies’ policy decisions as a result; regulators 
acting in the public interest will care about regulated parties’ concerns, 
and it is always welcomed when CMS and other agencies meaningfully 
consider regulated parties’ views when respectfully expressed and clearly 
articulated. 
  Unfortunately, all too often agencies fail to address critical issues 
raised in this fashion, leaving regulated parties with little recourse aside 
from litigation.  In the case of the physician narrative requirement, that 
was precisely what happened.  For the better part of four years, beginning 
almost immediately after CMS proposed the requirement in July 2010,109 
HHAs petitioned CMS to remove the overly burdensome, unauthorized, 
and incomprehensible physician narrative requirement—and, if nothing 
else, to provide clear guidance to physicians so that HHAs would not 
continue facing unpredictable and improper claims denials from 
Medicare contractors.  As CMS continued to remain largely unresponsive 
to providers’ significant difficulties, the national trade association 
representing HHAs ultimately brought suit, seeking relief for its 
members.110  During the course of the litigation, CMS rescinded the 
physician narrative requirement.111  It is impossible to tell whether CMS 
ultimately changed its mind based on provider input, fear of losing in 
court, political pressure, or some other reason.  Still, this situation may 
demonstrate the importance of persistence among providers, given that 
legal challenges can potentially spur agencies to retreat from harmful 
policies even if the challenges do not ultimately prevail in court. 
 
108 79 Fed. Reg. at 66043.  CMS further stated: “While we do not agree that the 
narrative requirement goes beyond Congressional intent, we agree that there should 
be sufficient evidence in the patient’s medical record to demonstrate that the patient 
meets the Medicare home health eligibility criteria.”  Id. 
109 Home Health Perspective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2011, 
75 Fed. Reg. 43236 (proposed July 23, 2010). 
110 Nat’l Ass’n for Home Care & Hospice v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-00950, 2015 WL 
6736165, (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2014). 
111 While the D.C. District Court later found for the government in a motion for 
summary judgment, CMS has not sought to reinstate the unlawful requirement.  Id. 
at 10.  
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  In addition to the un-recoupable costs of compliance, another 
problem caused by the unlawful physician narrative requirement was its 
lack of logic and basic fairness as applied.  Specifically, the regulation 
made receipt of an adequate physician narrative a condition of HHAs’ 
Medicare reimbursement but prohibited HHAs from drafting the 
narratives or assisting physicians with the drafting.  This policy therefore 
unfairly punished HHAs if Medicare contractors determined that 
physicians had failed to comply with CMS’s ambiguous and confusing 
(also unnecessary and unauthorized) physician narrative requirement, 
while simultaneously tying HHAs’ hands to prevent them from helping 
ensure that the narratives would be considered complete by contractors.  
Over the course of over three-and-a-half years, HHAs placed in this 
unfair position faced tens of thousands of retrospective claim denials 
based on Medicare contractor findings of incomplete physician 
narratives—despite the fact that (1) CMS had not provided adequate 
guidance to physicians, (2) CMS’s own contractors were applying the 
narrative requirement inconsistently, (3) claims would be denied if 
contractors deemed the narratives “insufficient” even if the patients’ 
overall medical records demonstrated the need for home health services, 
and (4) CMS had no authority in the first place to impose this 
requirement. 
  Had CMS not rescinded the physician narrative requirement, this 
volume of unwarranted claims denials ultimately could have severely 
threatened many HHAs’ ability to survive, which, in turn, would have 
posed major access problems for vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries 
requiring home health services.  Health care providers are, unfortunately, 
accustomed to receiving inadequate Medicare reimbursement and 
managing cumbersome administrative burdens imposed by payers 
(including Medicare).  However, providers are not invincible, and there 
are policies—such as the physician narrative requirement—that are so 
detrimental that they could force providers to close up shop.  As such, 
CMS should be mindful of how its own overreach can have adverse 
effects on the very beneficiaries it is charged with protecting under the 
Medicare program. 
3. Challenges for Dialysis Facilities and Beneficiaries Under the 
ESRD PPS 
  In implementing the ESRD PPS, CMS has transgressed statutory 
boundaries twice in bold, significant ways—first, in the unauthorized 
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addition of oral-only drugs into the bundle112 and, second, in the 
unauthorized use of a process to add new IV or injectable drugs into the 
bundle—and on a more discrete and incremental basis with the pervasive 
addition of items and services into the bundle (“bundle creep”).  These 
unsanctioned bundle expansions pose challenges to dialysis facilities that 
are paid a fixed amount per treatment under the ESRD PPS.  These same 
facilities have received zero percent updates from Medicare since 2012 
that will continue through 2016, but still are expected to provide 
beneficiaries with an increasing number of items and services in 
exchange for the same fixed payment amount, all while attaining and 
maintaining quality imperatives under at least three different Medicare 
measurement regimes, all of which add operational cost to the treating 
facility.113  While CMS often seems to let providers “fend for 
themselves” despite inadequate Medicare reimbursement across care 
settings, the situation is acutely worse at the moment for dialysis facilities 
with new dialysis drugs on the horizon that could be game-changing for 
patient treatment but extremely expensive in a system that has 
historically had difficulty attributing accurate cost data to prescription 
drugs, leaving facilities to absorb shortfalls. 
  More specifically, an IV version of the single source drug Sensipar 
is expected to become available in 2016.  The drug is expensive, and its 
clinical profile is not well understood, yet nephrologist and patient 
demand for it may be high.  Should CMS turn a blind eye to dialysis 
facilities’ plight by adding this new drug into the bundle without properly 
accounting for its cost to ESRD facilities (as has occurred time and time 
again over the course of the ESRD PPS), this would severely strain 
dialysis facilities.  Because these facilities are charged with caring for 
some of the most vulnerable patients, it is critical that they are adequately 
reimbursed so they can continue furnishing high-quality care and 
maintaining access for Medicare beneficiaries.  The CY 2016 ESRD PPS 
Final Rule suggests that, with respect to new therapies like Sensipar (i.e., 
new phosphate binders or calcimimetics), CMS will proceed cautiously 
and develop a “computation” for the cost and utilization of the new drug 
and pay facilities an average sales price-based alternative temporarily 
 
112 As noted above, implementation of this policy has been delayed by statute until 
2025.  See, supra note 84. 
113 While CMS does adjust the bundle payment amount annually through the 
regulatory process, increases to the bundle payment rate have not kept pace with 
expansions of the bundle and have been blocked by acts of Congress.  In addition, 
dialysis facilities must meet quality performance targets under the Quality Incentive 
Program, the Facility Compare and Star Rating Systems, and CROWNWeb. 
2016] HHS STAKEHOLDER RIGHTS 115 
 
before the agency simply drops the new drug into the bundle—an 
outcome about which facilities are cautiously optimistic.114  But, given 
the agency’s long history of manipulating statutes and statistics to its 
advantage and to achieve its Medicare and Medicaid program goals, it is 
an outcome over which trained eyes should be watchful.  The near-term 
result may quell facility worries about unfunded bundle expansion.  The 
longer-term reality is that CMS may in no way be willing or able to 
adequately compensate dialysis facilities for the price of Sensipar. 
  Regardless of the outcome on Sensipar, the consequences of 
CMS’s overreach and self-aggrandizing regulatory decision-making 
extend beyond dialysis facilities to the vulnerable patient population they 
serve.  In a fragile economic system, providers, expected to do more and 
more with fewer and fewer resources, may ultimately close facilities, 
forcing complex, chronically ill beneficiaries to travel farther to receive 
dialysis care (three times per week for at least four hours per session), 
interrupting their care, disrupting their “medical home,” and resulting in 
tremendous logistical and even clinical difficulties for these patients.  
Medicare beneficiaries on dialysis are disproportionately poor (48 
percent are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid), elderly (51 
percent are over age 65), and chronically ill (chiefly diabetes and 
hypertension).115  This is a population that, without aggressive resistance 
and pushback from Congress and the judiciary, may be the least capable 
of supporting itself in the wake of CMS’s self-centered decision-making 
that harms dialysis facilities and, as a result, puts dialysis patients at risk. 
  Congress recognized this uniquely critical role of dialysis facilities 
when creating the ESRD PPS.  During the debates leading to the 
establishment of the ESRD PPS, Senator Kent Conrad, then-Chair of the 
Senate Budget Committee, highlighted these issues, noting that “[w]hen 
Congress enacted the Medicare ESRD program, we recognized that this 
disease was unique and deserved special consideration,” urging Congress 
to act to ensure that these facilities be properly funded to continue 
providing high-quality care to a vulnerable patient population.116  Senator 
 
114 80 Fed. Reg. at 69025. 
115 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Health Care Spending and the 
Medicare Program, A Data Book, Ch. 11, 186, 187 (June 2015), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/data-book/june-2015-databook-health-care-
spending-and-the-medicare-program.pdf?sfvrsn=0.   
116 153 Cong. Rec. S2277 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2007) (statement of Sen. Conrad).  
Senator Conrad mentioned in particular that inadequate reimbursement had caused 
dialysis facilities to “experience[] difficulties in hiring qualified health care 
professionals and purchasing new technology.”  Id. 
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Max Baucus, then-Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, later echoed 
these sentiments during the debates on MIPPA, observing that the new 
ESRD PPS “would ensure that Medicare payments keep up with costs,” 
“giving [dialysis facilities] a little bit of predictability.”117  To balance 
these dual concerns for the Medicare program’s fiscal integrity and 
dialysis facilities’ need for adequate reimbursement to care for vulnerable 
Medicare beneficiaries, Congress carefully drafted the “renal dialysis 
services” definition in the ESRD PPS statutory provision.  By 
contravening the “renal dialysis services” statutory definition in pursuit 
of its own policy objectives, CMS has been disrupting the very balance 
Congress established to address these complex considerations, posing a 
threat not only to dialysis facilities but also to the vulnerable patients they 
serve. 
B.  CMS’s Expansive Interpretations of Its Statutory Authority as a 
Case Study of the Risk of Unchecked Agency Self-Aggrandizement 
  While acute care hospitals in designated MSAs required to 
participate in the CJR Model (and downstream PAC providers), HHAs 
subjected to the physician narrative requirement, and dialysis facilities 
paid inadequately under the ESRD PPS may already be attuned to CMS 
overreach and its harmful consequences, others in the health care 
provider community should be alert as well.  Agency self-
aggrandizement in one area can reveal an agency’s propensity to 
overreach and further embolden the agency to overreach in the future if it 
proceeds unchallenged.  This means that all parties subject (or potentially 
subject) to regulation by an agency should take notice if that agency 
develops a pattern of overreach. 
1. Overreach Begets Overreach 
  A primary example of agency overreach expanding from one 
setting to another is CMS’s move from conducting only voluntary 
payment and delivery models to finalizing two mandatory models in 
rapid succession, both in the absence of statutory authority.  In the CJR 
Final Rule, CMS noted: 
  [A]lthough CJR will be the first Innovation Center model in which 
acute care hospitals are required to participate, we refer readers to the 
2016 Home Health Prospective Payment System (HHP[P]S) Final Rule, 
which finalizes the Home Health Value-Based Purchasing (HHVBP) 
 
117 154 Cong. Rec. S6477 (daily ed. July 9, 2008) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus).   
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model.  Home health agencies in selected states will be required to 
participate in the HHVBP model beginning in January 2016.118 
  CMS have intended this remark to allay commenters’ worries 
about the novelty of the CJR Model’s mandatory participation 
requirement by pointing out another instance of a similar CMS mandate.  
However, rather than alleviating concerns, CMS’s response here actually 
causes further unease, regarding both the HHVBP Model’s mandatory 
implementation and the trend of CMS’s failure to follow statutory 
authorities. 
  With respect to the HHVBP Model, CMS identified its authority 
for the model under SSA Sections 1102, 1115A, and 1871,119 which are 
the same authorities it cited as permitting the CJR Model’s mandatory 
implementation.120  As addressed above in Section III (A), none of these 
provisions allows CMS to make models mandatory, and CMS did not 
attempt to explain why the agency believed these provisions authorized it 
to mandate participation in the HHVBP Model.  Instead, CMS focused 
on the policy reasons why it wanted to mandate participation in the 
model (i.e., to gather broader, unbiased data) and insisted that mandatory 
provider participation was “necessary” to achieve this goal.121  Still, 
because basic statutory construction principles prohibit agencies from 
deviating from clear statutory text to pursue their policy agendas,122 none 
of CMS’s cited authorities permit mandatory implementation of the 
HHVBP Model. 
  This is problematic not only because it signals a trend of CMS 
mandating provider participation in CMMI models absent statutory 
authority, but also because of the underlying attitude revealed by CMS.  
 
118 80 Fed. Reg. at 73277.   
119 Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model, 80 Fed. Reg. 68624, 68657 (Nov. 
5, 2015). 
120 80 Fed. Reg. at 73278.  In the context of the HHVBP Model, CMS described 
these statutory provisions as together “authoriz[ing] the Secretary to issue 
regulations to operate the Medicare program and test innovative payment models to 
improve coordination, quality, and efficacy of health care services furnished under 
Title XVIII.”  80 Fed. Reg. 68624, 68657.   
121 See id. at 68659 (“We believe it is necessary to require all HHAs delivering care 
within boundaries of selected states to be included in the model” because this 
“ensures that: (1) There is no self-selection bias, (2) competing HHAs are 
representative of HHAs nationally, and (3) there is sufficient participation to 
generate meaningful results.”).  
122 See e.g., Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n., 88 F.3d at 
1089; S. California Edison Co., 195 F.3d at 27. 
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In both the CJR Final Rule and the CY 2016 HHPPS Final Rule, CMS’s 
primary focus was described in terms of benefits of a broad, unbiased 
data set and of the “need” to mandate provider participation in order to 
obtain this information.123  CMS’s discussions lacked meaningful 
attention to the baseline question of whether mandating provider 
participation was permitted under governing authorities.  CMS’s 
attempted justification of its authority to mandate participation in the CJR 
Model was sparse and not reflective of a careful consideration of the 
statutes, and no explanation of the agency’s statutory interpretation (only 
citation to the provisions) was given regarding the HHVBP Model. 
  Moreover, CMS appears either not to recognize or not to care 
about the shaky statutory ground upon which it is mandating participation 
in CMMI models.  By pointing to the HHVBP Model in the CJR Final 
Rule in response to comments challenging the CJR Model’s mandatory 
implementation as unprecedented and unlawful, CMS is evincing either a 
woeful lack of attention to the governing authorities, an intentional 
diversion of attention, or an arrogant belief that its own actions have 
precedential value regardless of the law.  Such a “Look!  We’re doing the 
same thing over here too!” response will not create statutory authority but 
can result in further overreach as the agency comes to believe its own 
press.  Further, such overreach, and the attendant harm to providers and 
risk to beneficiaries, will continue unless action is taken to restore 
accountability to the administrative state. 
2. Challenges in Dislodging Entrenched Policies from the Federal 
System 
  While agency overreach is problematic generally, CMS’s 
overreaching is highly problematic due to the Administration’s goal of 
entrenching the ACA and other Democratic statutory priorities, which 
effectively incentivizes CMS to act aggressively to get its policies 
cemented before President Obama leaves office.  Moreover, the adverse 
consequences are greater for regulated parties when entrenched policies 
lack statutory authority or otherwise violate the law.  Entrenchment of the 
Obama Administration’s lawful policies may be a political irritation to an 
incoming Republican administration, but entrenchment of unlawful 
policies should be troubling to any law-abiding citizen, Democrat or 
Republican. 
  Once health care policies (lawful or unlawful) are entrenched in 
the federal system (the United States Code, the Code of Federal 
 
123 80 Fed. Reg. at 73278; 80 Fed. Reg. at 68659. 
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Regulations, etc.), unlocking or dislodging them is an extremely 
burdensome task fraught with risk, political and procedural, for any 
future administration and Congress, including those naturally in support 
of and those strongly opposed to the overarching statutes.  For 
Republican opponents of the ACA (and other Democratic statutory 
priorities), dislodging entrenched federal health policy decisions often 
comes with political friction from constituents who have grown 
accustomed to the laws’ benefits.  Furthermore, in the case of the ACA, 
Republican Members of Congress who oppose the ACA also face 
hostility from their home state senators and downright political resistance 
from state governors in their respective capitals, who, notwithstanding 
early rhetoric against the law and its Medicaid expansion in particular, 
are lining up to obtain the generous federal resources associated with 
Medicaid expansion.124 
  For Democrats in Congress or the White House who may object to 
the Obama Administration’s unlawful implementation of the ACA and 
other Democrat-backed statutes, dislodging entrenched policy would 
potentially be even harder, since many of them would have been, 
passively or actively, involved in the entrenchment.  Backing out of 
positions long-fought-for would conceivably be difficult but not 
impossible.  Thus far, with support from Republicans, Democrats have 
repealed the controversial tax on medical device sales, delayed for two 
years the start of the so-called “Cadillac tax” on high-cost health plans, 
and delayed the fee imposed on all health insurance products for one 
year.125  All of these repeals and delays were extremely popular with 
consumers, industry, and labor unions, however, so extracting them from 
their prior entrenched position was not difficult politically.126 
 
124 See Robert Pear, State-Level Brawls Over Medicaid Reflect Divide in G.O.P, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 27, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/us/politics/state-level-brawls-over-medicaid-
reflect-wider-war-in-gop.html?_r=0.  See also Jayne O’Donnell, President to 
propose incentive to lure more states to expand Medicaid, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 
2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/01/14/president-propose-
incentive-lure-more-states-expand-medicaid/78769622/ (identifying further 
Administration efforts to entrench its Medicaid expansion policy before the next 
election).  
125 See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
126 The “institutional pathologies” of Congress slow and complicate efforts to enact 
health care legislation in the first place, let alone efforts to muster the political will 
to repeal or enact revisions to existing law.  See Gluck, Symposium, supra note 37, 
at 14.  See also infra Part V(B). 140.  
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  Still, the core features of the ACA—the tax credits and subsidies, 
the Medicaid expansion, the free preventive screening benefits, and, as 
this Article shows, the less glamorous but still hugely consequential 
payment and regulatory reforms—continue unabated, despite outcries 
from stakeholders and from Congress about overreach and 
aggressiveness by regulators.  The truth is, unless health care lawyers 
remain vigilant from the start, before these policies become entrenched, it 
may be too late to ever uproot them and to make a material difference on 
behalf of their clients’ rights as HHS stakeholders in an era of statutory 
entrenchment and agency overreach. 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
  It is one thing to identify and understand a problem and quite 
another to propose and evaluate solutions to it; both parts of the equation 
are essential.  Without careful definition of a problem, including its 
sources and its scope, solutions cannot be formulated or evaluated 
properly; without an accurate understanding of a problem’s magnitude, 
stakeholders may fail to give the attention necessary to address it.  The 
primary focus of this Article is the former task—definition of the 
problem of Executive Branch agency overreach, by examining specific 
examples of CMS ultra vires action, situating these examples in the 
broader context of executive agency self-aggrandizement, and urging 
health care providers and lawyers to be on the lookout for further 
instances of this pattern as CMS continues on its mission to entrench the 
ACA and the Democratic health reform agenda.  The remaining section 
of the Article turns to some potential means of addressing the problem.  
This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to call 
attention to some of the options currently being considered and to offer a 
preliminary recommendation for congressional consideration.  Future 
work will provide more specific policy recommendations. 
A.  Where is the Judiciary? 
  Judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations has garnered 
much attention in recent years, especially leading up to the King decision, 
as well as in its wake.  This attention is well-placed, given the high 
degree of deference courts afford to agencies in statutory cases.  A major 
empirical study of over 1000 Supreme Court cases from 1984 to 2006 
involving an agency statutory or regulatory interpretation found an 
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average agency win rate of 68.3 percent.127  Empirical studies of circuit 
courts have found similar affirmance rates.128  Of note, the D.C. Circuit, 
which decides more than 25 percent of all circuit court cases reviewing 
agency actions,129 defers measurably less than other circuit courts—11 
percent or 12 percent less, according to two empirical studies.130 
  Many observers have been critical of these high rates of judicial 
deference to agencies, contending, among other things, that excessive 
judicial deference to agencies has “blurred the lines that once separated 
the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch, and the Judicial Branch”131 
and that such deference also results in agency self-aggrandizement, as 
“[a]gencies are emboldened to take more aggressive and daring positions 
on the assumption that courts are unlikely to rebuff their actions.”132  Of 
note, over the course of the October 2014 Term, Justice Thomas 
 
127 William N. Eskridge Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1100 (2007-2008).   
128 See Richard J. Pierce Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions Mean? (hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review), 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84 
(2011) (citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 849 (2006); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review 
(hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review), 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 766-
68, 776, 779 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007); Frank B. 
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2168, 2172 
(1998); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the 
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 30 (1997); Peter 
H. Shuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law (hereinafter Shuck & Elliott, Empirical Study), 1990 
DUKE L. J. 984, 1007, 1008, 1030 tbl. 3, 1038. 
129 Miles & Sunstein, Arbitrariness Review, supra note 128, at 794-95. 
130 Id. at 795 (finding 11% less deference than other circuits from 1996 to 2006); 
Shuck & Elliott, Empirical Study, supra note 128, at 1041-42 (finding 12% fewer 
affirmances in 1984). 
131 Proper Role of Judicial Review, supra note 15 (statement of Senator James 
Lankford, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs’ Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal 
Management) (Apr. 28, 2015), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/examining-the-proper-role-of-judicial-
review-in-the-federal-regulatory-process.  
132 Schiff & Wake, Agency Overreach, supra note 36, at 106.  
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repeatedly raised significant challenges to the constitutionality of the 
administrative state and the judicial deference doctrines.133  Some 
observers have noted a recent trend at the Supreme Court to scale back its 
application of existing deference doctrines and have predicted an increase 
in this practice, and as discussed above, King could signal the 
continuance of this trend.134 
  Should the Court continue scaling back its deference to agency 
statutory and regulatory interpretations, this could help combat the 
“aggressive executive action [that] has pushed [the deference doctrines’] 
latent defects to the surface” in recent years.135  As such, movement at the 
Supreme Court, and as a result at the circuit courts, regarding the 
 
133 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers, 135 S. Ct. at 1220, 1221 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“Because the agency is thus not properly constituted to 
exercise the judicial . . . under the Constitution, the transfer of interpretive judgment 
raises serious separation-of-powers concern”) (“[t]he judiciary has a responsibility 
to decide cases properly before it,” including “not only  constitutional challenges to 
particular statues, including those based on the separation of powers, but also . . . 
more routine questions about the best interpretation of statutes, or the compatibility 
of agency actions with enabling statutes.”) (internal citations omitted); B&B 
Hardware v. Hargis Indus., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(raising constitutional separation-of-powers concerns about agency adjudication of 
“claims involving core private rights”); Dep’t. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 
S. Ct. at 1254-–-55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“We have too long 
abrogated our duty to enforce the separation of powers required by our Constitution.  
We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that 
concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of 
a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no comfortable home in 
our constitutional structure.”). 
134 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference (Oct. 12, 2015) 
(unpublished article) (on file with the George Washington Univ. L. Sch.), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2672979; Gluck, Imperfect 
Statutes, supra note 21, at 94.  As mentioned supra, two possible outgrowths of 
King are that the Court could expand major questions doctrine at Chevron Step Zero 
to remove more statutory interpretation cases from agencies, or that the Court could 
apply its own view of the “legislative plan” more proactively to find more statutes 
clear and unambiguous at Chevron Step One.  But see Hickman, Unintended 
Consequences, supra note 25, at 66, 71 (cautioning that “although Chief Justice 
Roberts arguably tried to make a significant doctrinal statement about Chevron’s 
scope, it seems unlikely that his colleagues intended to embrace the most sweeping 
interpretation of his views” and that “if a majority of the justices are not really on 
board with the doctrinal adjustment, then much like Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 
King v. Burwell will fade into obscurity as doctrinally insignificant with respect to 
Chevron’s scope”). 
135 Grossman statement, supra note 75, at 9. 
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deference doctrines will be important to all regulated parties—both in 
terms of the level of deference afforded by courts to the agency 
interpretations that regulated parties may wish to challenge, as well as in 
terms of the reduction in agency overreach that could potentially follow 
from agency awareness that courts are not deferring as extensively as in 
the past.  Either more careful scrutiny of agency interpretations and 
actions by the judiciary or increased agency self-regulation (in the form 
of closer attention and fidelity to authorizing statutes in the absence of 
such a heavy hand on the scales in their favor as at present) would be a 
welcome step in containing agency overreach.  Much remains unsettled 
at present, however. 
  In particular, the D.C. Circuit recently issued a disconcerting 
opinion regarding an HHS interpretation of a statutory provision 
regarding inpatient psychiatric hospital reimbursement.136  The court 
analyzed HHS’s interpretation under Chevron, upholding the agency 
interpretation as “not only reasonable but also the best interpretation of 
the statute”—in and of itself a debatable, but not unusual conclusion.137  
What is troubling in the opinion is the court going out of its way to note 
that “[t]he Supreme Court has made clear that courts must give 
heightened deference to [an agency’s] interpretation of a ‘complex and 
highly technical regulatory program’ such as Medicare.”138  As 
mentioned above, agencies already have incentives to push the bounds of 
statutory language, knowing that courts are highly likely to grant their 
interpretations deference under Chevron.  In this light, the D.C. Circuit’s 
recent reaffirmation that it will give “heightened deference” to 
interpretations of the Medicare statute by HHS and its divisions is highly 
concerning, due to (1) the added incentives that this stated position of the 
court gives to HHS and CMS to continue pushing the envelope, counting 
on receiving increased levels of judicial deference, (2) the fact that HHS 
has already demonstrated a dangerous pattern of overreach, which may 
only be exacerbated by more highly deferential review in the D.C. 
Circuit, and (3) the fact that the D.C. Circuit hears such a high percentage 
of challenges to agency action and thereby directly controls the outcome 
in many agency cases and also holds substantial influence over other 
circuit courts in administrative law matters.  Rather than granting 
“heightened deference” to HHS, courts should be applying heightened 
scrutiny to HHS in the face of its established tendency to overstep 
 
136 Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. Burwell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22742 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
137 Id. at *11. 
138 Id. at *10 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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statutory authority.  Because of this troubling reversal of appropriate 
levels of deference to HHS recently announced by the D.C. Circuit, and 
the uncertainty in general surrounding doctrinal development at the 
Supreme Court, the discussion in the following section of congressional 
solutions is all the more critical. 
B.  Where is Congress? 
  In light of the increasing problem of agency overreach, as well as 
the heightened threat posed by the current Administration’s efforts to 
entrench its health care policies, Congress must act to address these 
issues.  Because of Members’ responsibilities to constituents, many of 
whom benefit from specific acts of agency overreach (when they are the 
“winners” in the given instance) and from certain elements of the ACA 
more broadly, and because of the fractious and shortened work weeks in 
Washington, “politics as usual” effectively prohibits (or discourages) 
many in Congress from pushing back and addressing agency self-
aggrandizement.  This characterization does not extend to all Members, 
however, as those who serve on committees of jurisdiction over health 
care have probed deeply into the conduct of ACA programs in 2015.139  
While judicial efforts to decrease deference to agency statutory and 
regulatory interpretations could help ensure that agencies act in closer 
accord with their congressional delegations of authority, Congress must 
do its part as well, despite “institutional patholog[y]” against such action 
stemming from party politics (i.e., allies of the Executive Branch tend to 
stay “in line” while opponents are dismissed as “agitators”).140  It is much 
 
139 The House Ways and Means Committee and Energy and Commerce Committee, 
and the Senate Finance Committee, in particular, have convened multiple hearings 
addressing problematic aspects of the Administration’s ACA implementation 
efforts.  See infra note 147.  Senator Marco Rubio, member of the Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship, has led a relentless effort to prevent taxpayer-
funded bailouts of health insurance companies under the ACA.  See, e.g., 
Obamacare Taxpayer Bailout Prevention Act, S. 123, 114th Cong. (2015).  Senators 
Ron Wyden and Chuck Grassley of the Senate Finance Committee spearheaded an 
investigation into excessive drug prices that were further enabled by the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion.  S. Prt. No. 114-20 (2015), The Price of Sovaldi and Its Impact 
on the U.S. Health Care System, available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=8c1720be-ed5d-
4abb-830b-e4dba70faa83. 
140 See Gluck, Symposium, supra note 37, at 14 (identifying the need for a “study of 
how Congress’s institutional pathologies affect health policy”).  Congressional 
passivity as “patholog[y]” in health policy is in many ways “institutional,” largely 
stemming from: (1) the assignment of particular health care issues to distinct expert 
panels, enabling Members to easily sidestep calls to address specific issues with the 
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overdue for Congress to step up its oversight of the regulatory process 
and agency action, and time is of the essence for the enactment of even 
incremental regulatory reform initiatives that give Congress and the 
public more transparency and a greater voice in decision-making and 
direction of taxpayer resources. 
  Some tools for congressional oversight have long been in place but 
have generally been underutilized as a historic matter.  Importantly, the 
APA, enacted in 1946 and described as “the bill of rights for the new 
regulatory state,”141 includes some built-in safeguards to help ensure 
transparency and accountability of the rulemaking process and the proper 
judicial oversight of agency action.142  The Senate and the House 
Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over the APA, which allows these 
committees to oversee the APA’s operation, study its effectiveness, and, 
where appropriate, legislate revisions.  However, over the years, these 
committees have largely failed to hold executive agencies to the law 
under their APA oversight authority, as noted recently by Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley in testimony for a 
Judiciary Committee hearing focused on the need for enhanced agency 
oversight.  Chairman Grassley lamented that, “we see repeated efforts 
today by agencies to undermine the public’s role in the rulemaking 
 
“sorry, not an expert, not on that committee” dodge; (2) the outsized role played by 
the annual federal budget process and Congress’s chief actuary, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), allowing Members to play the “sorry, CBO said it had no 
time to ‘score’ my bill” card; and (3) the inherent difficulty in passing legislation at 
all (especially health care or Medicare legislation) in a leadership-driven Congress 
(cue the “sorry, maybe we’ll look at it next year” deflection).  See id. at 14-16 
(discussing these and other “institutional features of Congress” bearing on health 
law and policy matters).  All of these institutional features essentially create a 
Congress frozen in its ability to effectively oversee and manage implementation of 
health care initiatives in federal agencies, which is especially troubling in an era of 
overreach and entrenchment inside virtually all agencies responsible for 
implementing the ACA.  
141 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996).   
142 For instance, Section 553 of the APA establishes the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, including publication in the Federal Register, opportunities for 
stakeholder comments, and finalization only after the agency has reviewed 
comments submitted.  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).  Section 706 of the APA provides that 
“the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability 
of the terms of an agency action,” though of course in practice, the judicial 
deference doctrines have greatly reduced the extent to which courts meaningfully 
perform these functions of judicial review.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).   
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process—and tactics that render the notice-and-comment process a mere 
formality” and called upon the Judiciary Committee “to improve our 
oversight of [the APA]” to help curb these regulatory excesses.143  
Enhanced oversight under the existing authority of the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees would be a critical first step in addressing agency 
overreach by helping ensure that safeguards already included in the APA 
function as intended. 
  Beyond the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and their 
jurisdiction over the APA, other committees also have jurisdiction over 
specific statutes and executive agencies.  For HHS and CMS and the 
federal health care program statues, the committees of jurisdiction are: 
House Energy and Commerce; House Ways and Means; Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions; Senate Finance; and to a limited extent, 
the Senate Special Committee on Aging.  Both the House and the Senate 
also have permanent oversight committees or subcommittees that each 
have health and entitlement program oversight.144  The House and Senate 
Small Business Committees are also frequently approached about federal 
agency overreach.  These committees have authority to call 
Administration witnesses, issue subpoenas for documents, interview 
interested parties, hold hearings, and issue reports and findings.145  In 
2015 alone, these committees have used their authority to call multiple 
 
143 Examining the Federal Regulatory System (Grassley statement), supra note 16, at 
1, 2.  Testimony at the hearing covered a wide variety of existing problems with the 
regulatory process, including agency failure to comply with existing congressional 
and executive transparency and accountability requirements, agency “closed 
mindedness” and “circumvention” of the APA’s notice-and-comment process, and 
inadequate oversight of “citizen suits.”  See Examining the Federal Regulatory 
System, supra note 15 (statement of William Kovacs, Senior Vice President, 
Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (June 
10, 2015), at 11, 12, 14, available at 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-10-
15%20Kovacs%20Testimony.pdf; Examining the Federal Regulatory System, supra 
note 15 (statement of Ellen Steen, General Counsel and Secretary, American Farm 
Bureau Federation) (June 10, 2015), at 10, available at 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-10-
15%20Steen%20Testimony%20Update.pdf.  
144 These committees are, in the House, the Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee, and in the Senate, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. 
145 In general, subpoena power is controlled by the majority and while conventional 
court rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, do not apply, respondents are entitled to some protections especially 
under Senate Rules. 
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witnesses and hold several hearings regarding problems in the 
implementation of the ACA and other Democrat-supported health 
policies.146  Despite this laudable effort, these exercises alone are simply 
not enough.  Congress needs more than a microphone to reign in the 
excesses of these and other future Executive Branch bureaucrats 
dedicated to essentially flouting and tying the hands of Congress. 
  Another existing but historically underutilized tool of 
congressional oversight was established by the Congressional Review 
Act (CRA), enacted in 1996.147  The CRA enables Congress to reject 
final agency rules by passing a joint resolution of disapproval, a 
safeguard designed to help restore Congress’s ability to supervise 
executive agencies’ implementation of the legislative powers delegated to 
them by Congress.148  Since the CRA’s enactment, agencies have 
submitted more than 60,000 final rules to Congress, but Congress has 
used the CRA process to disapprove only one rule.149  Congress’s 
underuse of The CRA largely stems from the fact that a joint resolution 
of disapproval, once passed by both the House and Senate, must be 
 
146 See, e.g., Hearing on the State of Obamacare’s CO-OP Program Before the 
House Ways and Means Committee’s Subcommittee on Health, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(calling Mandy Cohen, CMS Chief Operating Officer and Chief of Staff, to testify); 
Hearing on Reviewing HealthCare.gov Controls Before the Senate Finance 
Committee, 114th Cong. (2015) (discussing results from the Government 
Accountability Office’s undercover testing of the enrollment and application 
controls of the federal Health Insurance Marketplace); Hearing on An Overdue 
Checkup Part II: Examining the ACA’s State Insurance Marketplaces Before the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigation, 114th Cong. (2015) (calling Andy Slavitt, CMS Acting Administrator, 
to testify). 
147 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-–-808 (2012). 
148 For instance, CRA Section 801 requires agencies to submit rules to Congress 
before they become effective, and CRA Section 802 establishes procedures 
Congress may use to cause such rules to “have no force or effect.”  5 U.S.C. §§ 
801(a)(1)(A), 802(a) (2012). 
149 Specifically, Congress disapproved OSHA’s November 2000 final rule on 
ergonomics in March 2001, and the President signed the joint resolution of 
disapproval into law on March 20, 2001.  U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, 
Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68261 (Nov. 14, 2000); S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (became Pub. L. No. 107-5).  See Curtis W. Copeland, Congressional Review 
Act: Many Recent Final Rules Were Not Submitted to GAO and Congress (July 15, 
2014), at 12, available at 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRA%2520Report%25200725%
2520%25282%2529.pdf.  
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presented to the President who most likely would veto the joint resolution 
(supporting the Administration’s own agency’s rule).150 
  Still, Congress could seek to maximize the “less discernable 
effects” of the CRA.151  As noted by one expert: 
  CRA resolutions of disapproval can be a valuable tool of Congress 
of congressional oversight even if the resolution is not ultimately 
enacted.  Simply by introducing a resolution, a Member of Congress can 
draw attention to a rule of concern, and may put pressure on the issuing 
agency to delay or withdraw the rule.  Recorded votes on the resolutions 
can put Members on the record regarding controversial rules.152 
  In fact, the 114th Congress has already been making increased use 
of the CRA (for a variety of complex reasons), with both houses passing 
resolutions of disapproval three times in 2015.153  Congress should 
continue using the CRA to highlight and address agency overreach, 
especially during the election cycle when Members may have increased 
opportunities to leverage the CRA process.  This puts political pressure 
on those who are up for reelection, and seeks to increase the 
accountability of agencies to Congress and that of Members of Congress 
to their constituents. 
  In contrast to the CRA and some congressional committee 
oversight tools (such as hearings), which are used to evaluate agency 
action after the fact, Congress also has the ability to address problems of 
overreach on the frontend by drafting clearer, more detailed statutes, 
rather than leaving such extensive ambiguities to be resolved by 
agencies.  As Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Grassley recently 
observed: 
 
150 Copeland, supra note 149, at 12.  While Congress can override presidential 
vetoes of joint resolutions, as with other legislation, it is not easy to garner the two-
thirds majorities needed in both houses to do so. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 47.  See also Morton Rosenberg, The Critical Need for Effective 
Congressional Review of Agency Rules: Background and Considerations for 
Incremental Reform, Report Prepared for the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (July 18, 2012), at 14-17, available at 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRA%20_%20Final%20Report.
pdf (discussing several examples of congressional efforts to use the CRA’s joint 
disapproval process to affect agency action). 
153 President Obama vetoed one of these joint resolutions, S.J.RES. R.8, addressing a 
National Labor Relations Board rule, in March 2015 and the other two, S.J.RES. 
R.23 and S.J.RES. R.24, both regarding EPA rules, in December 2015. Authority 
regarding vetoing of joint resolutions. 
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  It’s equally important that Congress recognize its own 
responsibility in the expansion of the administrative state.  For too long, 
Congress has delegated in broad strokes, asking the agencies to sort out 
the details.  If Congress is going to ask courts to tackle the tough 
questions, it needs to be willing to do so itself by reasserting its 
lawmaking power—and by speaking clearly and precisely when it 
chooses to use that power.154 
  Under the existing deference doctrines under which courts review 
agency interpretations of statutes and regulations, Congress is 
incentivized to draft broad statutes (either to ease enactment, or deflect 
public criticism, or both) and allow agencies to make the detailed 
decisions required for implementation—a task that often involves picking 
winners and losers among regulated parties and/or imposing significant 
regulatory burdens on individuals and organizations—knowing that 
agency interpretations are likely to be sustained in court.155  Thus, while 
Congress certainly profits from the existing arrangement, it must sacrifice 
some of these political benefits in the service of combating the agency 
self-aggrandizement that follows from broad and unmonitored 
delegations of legislative authority to agencies.156 
  The APA, CRA, and congressional committee process have all 
shown their limits.  While well intentioned, they have not changed the 
subject or the environment one bit.  Good congressional oversight can 
embarrass federal agencies and, in the best circumstances, lead to 
resignations.  However, those cases are few and far between, and are 
insufficient given the size and scale of the threat faced by rogue agencies 
that are more committed to getting their policies “in the door” than to 
implementing policies consistent with the rule of law and congressional 
intent.  Congress needs a new mechanism to monitor and put an end to 
this behavior.  The mechanism should be neutral enough to survive and 
thrive under any administration and any concoction of political 
leadership in the House and Senate; that is, it should be bipartisan.  
 
154 Examining the Federal Regulatory System (Grassley statement), supra note 16, at 
3303. 
155 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 128, at 84 (citing empirical studies finding that 
circuit courts and the Supreme Court defer to agency statutory interpretations in 
approximately two-thirds of cases under the courts’ deference doctrines). 
156 Leading thinkers, including Justice Thomas, have argued that such delegation of 
legislative authority to executive agencies is unconstitutional in the first place, 
though such arguments are outside the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Dep’t. of 
Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.’s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240-55 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  
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Moreover, it should give Congress the confidence that the laws it passes 
are fairly and effectively implemented within the letter and the spirit with 
which they were written—not ignored or contorted beyond the point of 
recognition by an agency with any objective in mind other than that of 
the Members who drafted, argued, revised, debated, voted, and ultimately 
sent to the President a public law as direct representatives of their 
constituent taxpayers. 
  The success of the qui tam provisions of the federal False Claims 
Act (FCA)157 in curbing waste, fraud, and abuse provides an apt model 
here, albeit more analogical than actual.  The qui tam provisions allow 
individual whistleblowers (“relators”) to pursue cases in federal district 
court alleging fraud, abuse, and government wrongdoing.  Depending on 
the nature of the case and whether the Department of Justice “intervenes” 
or “declines” participation, if successful, relators may recover treble 
damages.158  The House, particularly the Senate Judiciary Committees, 
have always been Congress’s strongest supporters of the FCA and of 
private rights of action pursued by “private attorneys general.”  
Recognizing that neither the Judiciary Committees nor Congress can 
monitor every action of every federal agency at once (not even the 
handful of agencies responsible for implementing the ACA), the 
Judiciary Committees should consider a narrow, limited private attorney 
general-like provision that would allow government employee 
whistleblowers of any level to bring forth evidence of agency overreach 
(either in development or after the fact) to either the Judiciary 
Committees or to Congress’s auditors, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), and authorize an investigation based on the 
whistleblower’s claims.  Whistleblowers would need to be protected, 
including preservation of their anonymity and other reasonable 
accommodations to secure their status as federal employees.  If the 
investigation concluded that the agency had, in fact, overreached and 
intentionally violated or recklessly disregarded congressional language 
and intent in implementing an act of Congress, then the whistleblower 
should be awarded a remedy, such as a share in the savings associated 
with termination of employees responsible for the misconduct, a step 
promotion, and/or a time-off award. 
  Finally, Congress should carefully consider the regulatory reform 
bills currently pending, as well as any that may be introduced.  Some of 
these bills are aimed at ensuring adequate congressional review of new 
 
157 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).  
158 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). 
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costly regulations before they take effect,159 while others are focused on 
eliminating existing regulations that are unnecessary or excessively 
costly.160  Still others would require federal agencies to conduct “sunset” 
reviews of significant regulations—and empower individuals adversely 
affected by such regulations to petition for “sunset” review—to help 
prevent the retention of regulations that have become outdated or 
duplicative.161  Well-designed regulatory reform legislation enacted now 
could help curb agency overreach if the next administration’s agencies 
behave like the Obama Administration’s agencies.  Such legislation is 
important in addressing overreach by all agencies and is of critical 
significance vis-à-vis agencies, like CMS at present, seeking to entrench 
unlawful policies. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  Agency overreach and self-aggrandizement permeate the current 
legal and regulatory landscape, affecting countless sectors of our 
economy and society.  Such unauthorized action is growing for a variety 
of reasons, including inadequate congressional oversight, excessive 
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, and increase in the 
number of agencies.162  Especially in the domain of CMS/HHS where the 
Obama Administration is working with an intentional strategy of 
entrenching its policy positions, the longer federal agencies are allowed 
to aggressively implement policies, the more difficult these unauthorized 
regulations and practices will be to replace with lawful regulations and 
 
159 See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, S. 226, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  
160 See, e.g., Searching for and Cutting Regulations that are Unnecessarily 
Burdensome, SCRUB Act, H.R. 1155, 114th Cong. (2015).  
161 See, e.g., Regulatory Review and Sunset Act, H.R. 2010, 114th Cong. (2015).  
162 As lamented by the Chief Justice in his striking dissent in City of Arlington a few 
terms back, Congress has established over 50 new agencies in the past two decades, 
and the ACA “creates, requires others to create, or authorizes dozens of new entities 
to implement the legislation.”  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Curtis W. Copeland, New Entities 
Created Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010), at 1, 
available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ah
UKEwi6jbjZmJPKAhVJVh4KHSRyDN0QFggdMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fww
w.aamc.org%2Fdownload%2F133856%2Fdata%2Fcrsentities.pdf.pdf&usg=AFQjC
NEGfdik7L6aLqBarhOY4KVyR0b0dg&sig2=9PxmyzNAwhmKPZFmmSStEQ).  
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policies.  Moreover, much of the harm done by agency overreach cannot 
be undone even once an unauthorized policy has been stopped.  By the 
time an illegal policy is reversed, regulated parties may have already 
spent thousands of dollars in compliance efforts, not to mention the time 
and money it may have cost the party that challenged the agency in court 
and the cost to taxpayers of the government’s efforts defending its 
unlawful policy.  Reigning in executive agencies is critical in curtailing 
such government waste, injustice to regulated parties, and violation of 
rule of law principles. 
  Without delay, Congress should step up its oversight of agency 
action under its existing oversight authority, and should also enact 
regulatory reform legislation designed to address existing, and prevent 
future, agency excess.  Regulated industry stakeholders and their 
advocates must remain vigilant with regard to agency overreach, calling 
attention to unauthorized government action and bringing challenges in 
court when necessary.  In the realm of health care law, in particular, 
lawyers have the unique opportunity and imperative to contribute to 
nationwide policymaking efforts, including identifying and combating 
entrenchment of unauthorized CMS policies and promoting better 
implementation efforts going forward.  As Former Secretary Sebelius 
underscored at YLS’s recent launch of the Solomon Center, “[t]here is no 
time in our country where there has been more need for people who 
emerge from a discipline with an integrated knowledge of the impact of 
law on health and health on law, and what business means to all of that, 
and can bring that expertise both into the courtroom but into the policy 
offices across the country . . .”163  The Solomon Center’s groundbreaking, 
multidisciplinary approach has immense potential to accomplish its goal 
of “influenc[ing] regulatory, business, judicial, and legislative policy” 
going forward, and health care industry stakeholders will be well-served 
by keeping a pulse on the promising work of the Solomon Center.164 
  After years of health reform battles, the attention of Congress and 
of the electorate in this critical election year is rightly focused on health 
care.  In this era marked by cutting-edge medical advances, including the 
transformative possibilities of personalized medicine—but also pervaded 
by threats of increasing costs of care, rising national debt, uncertainty 
about the future of the Social Security system, and international 
economic crises—the need for wise, well-informed, measured policy-
 
163 Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, supra note 32, at 23:53-24:21. 
164 Solomon Center for Health L. & Pol’y, About the Center, available at 
https://www.law.yale.edu/solomon-center/about-us/about-center (last visited Jan. 8, 
2016). 
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making is at a premium.  There is vast potential to enhance the well-
being of citizens throughout the nation—and the world—with the 
resources, knowledge, skills, and technology now in existence and in 
development, and at such a momentous time in history, short-sighted, 
hasty, and politically-motivated decision-making could result in 
catastrophic consequences for years to come.  Now is not a time to seek 
to entrench political priorities before the clock runs out or to promote 
policies that will garner good soundbytes in the popular media and trade 
press but that will not accomplish the benefits they promise over time.  
Now is a time for robust discussion of health policy, including voices 
from academia, government, business, law, and the non-profit sector, in 
order to capitalize on all the potential gains there are to be made.  The 
Solomon Center stands perfectly poised to accomplish just this—bringing 
together a wide variety of multidisciplinary experts to debate, research, 
and explore policy solutions—and to make a vital impact on future health 
reform efforts.  Health lawyers should seek ways of becoming and 
remaining involved in such efforts, bringing their in-depth knowledge of 
the federal health law and regulatory landscape and the agencies charged 
with implementing these authorities as well as their awareness of places 
where these agencies need to be held more carefully to the governing 
statutes. 
  In order to ensure that the benefits of any advances made in health 
reform are not lost due to illegalities in the substance or procedure of 
agency implementation efforts, the next administration must make legal 
implementation a priority.  Agency aggrandizement and disregard for the 
law is in many ways a top-down problem.  The next president has the 
tremendous opportunity and responsibility to strike a fundamentally 
different tone than the Obama Administration has, and to set our nation 
back on its proper course, wherein separation of powers is respected by 
all three branches of government, the rule of law governs, and a short-
term political gain mentality is replaced with a longer-term concern for 
the actual effects of policies on all players, not just on the president’s 
favored groups at the expense of those he wants to make pay for his 
promises. 
 
